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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the Ambon conflict from 1999 to 2002, and discusses the 
reconciliation process by which the conflict was resolved. It argues that there were two 
significant factors in the conflict. First, ethno-religious segregation existed in the 
Ambonese islands from pre-colonial times until the present. Under the New Order regime 
(1965-1998) a situation of Christian dominance changed to one of Muslim dominance in 
terms of access to local political power and economic resources. Secondly, a culture of 
premanism existed whereby gangs, thugs and laskars with the support of State elements 
(including security forces) were able to incite ethno-religious conflict. Both 'state 
premanism' and loose informal groups, coming under the category of 'private 
premanism' , played a pivotal role in instigating, inflaming and continuing the conflict by 
provoking both the Muslim and Christian communities to attack each other. 
The Coker preman, an Ambon-based gang, under leadership of Berty Loupatty and Agus 
Wattimena (50, d. 2001), had operated in Muslim and Christian regions since the 1980s. 
They gained the support of elements in the Indonesian Armed Forces who used them to 
instigate the earlier conflict in December 1998 and the conflict from 19 January 1999 
onwards. With the aid of handy-talkies, hand-phones and standard military weapons, the 
provocateurs successfully forced Ambonese Muslims and Christians into ethno-religious 
conflict. Christians were provoked to oppose having transmigrant and migrant (Butonese, 
Buginese, Makassarese, Javanese and Sumatran (called BBM)) Muslims, living with them 
in the islands. By contrast, both indigenous and migrant Muslims assumed that Christians 
cooperated with the separatist Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) group, as represented by 
the Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Moluccan Sovereign Front) with Alex Manuputty as 
chairperson. Rumours spread that Christians were seeking to conduct Muslim-cleansing in 
the Moluccas. In March 1999, Javanese Muslims responded by declaring a Jihad against 
the Christians-cum-separatists, to protect Ambonese Muslims from Christian slaughter 
and to defend the Indonesian nation against the separatist threat. Furthermore, in the name 
of religion and nationalism, the Laskar Jihad took up the banner of Jihad in Ambon in 
January 2000. This Jihad movement forced Ambonese Christians to seek a greater 
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Christian solidarity and to mobilise in the form of the Laskar Kristus (Christ Warriors). 
They also sought international intervention to resolve the conflict. 
Mainstream Ambonese Muslims and Christians were eager to forge a reconciliation. They 
had attempted to do so from the early stages of the conflict in January 1999 up until the 
Malino II agreement in February 2002. Muslims and Christians proposed the strategy of 
re-implementating the Pela Gandong tradition as a basis for inter-ethnic or inter-religious 
harmony. Measures to ensure equality of public access to political positions and economic 
resources for both the Muslim and Christian communities had to be negotiated. This 
underlined to both communities the importance of structuring a local democracy, by 
assimilating local tradition and modem values. It also highlighted the necessity for real 
power and economic-sharing arrangements under professional security forces in the spirit 
of regional autonomy. 
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respectively. 
Vlll 
Glossary and Abbreviations 
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia); became TNI in 1999. 
AMNM Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar (Enjoining Right Forbidding Evil), commander-
in-chief, Muhammad At-Tamimy. 
BBM Butonese, Buginese and Makassarese, a term for migrant Muslims in the 
Moluccas, which also covers Javanese, Sumatrans and other non-indigenous 
Muslims. 
BIMM Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku (State Body ofMoluccan Muslims), chaired by 
Ustaz Ali Fauzi. 
Coker Cowok-Cowok Keren (Handsome Boys), Cowok-Cowok Kerempeng (Thin Boys), 
Cowok-Cowok Kristen (Christian Boys), a gang based in Kudamati, Ambon and 
supported by the Special Armed Forces (Kopassus) during the conflict in opposing 
the FKM group. 
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia). 
FKA WJ Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama 'ah (the Communication forum 
for the Followers of the Prophet and His Disciples). 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Council). 
DPRl Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Tingkat) L a provincial level of the People's 
Representative Council. 
DPR2 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Tingkat) IL a district level of the People's 
Representative Council. 
FKM Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Moluccan Sovereign Front). 
FPIM Front Pembela Islam Maluku (Moluccan Islamic Defenders Front), chaired by 
Husni Puttuhena. 
GPM Gereja Protestan Maluku (Moluccan Protestant Church). 
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals). 
Jihad Holy War. 
KISDIKomite Solidaritas Islam (Islamic Solidarity Committee). 
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (the Royal Dutch East Indies Army). 
KOMPAK Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (Crisis Solving Committee). 
Laskar Jihad Holy Warriors, a paramilitary wing of the Forum Komunikasi Ah/us 
Sunnah Wal Jama 'ah (FKA WJ), based in Yogyakarta. 
Laskar Kristus Christ Warriors, a Christian paramilitary group founded in response to the 
coming of the Laskar Jihad in 2000, led by Agus Wattimena (50 d. 2001). 
LIPI Lembaga !!mu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Science Institute). 
LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pendidikan Islam dan Arab (Institute for Islamic and Arabic 
Studies). 
LSM Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (Non-government Organisation). 
MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly). 
MPR Maje/is Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly). 
MUI Maje/is Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Assembly). 
NGO Non-government Organisation. 
NIT Negara Indonesia Timur (State of Eastern Indonesia). 
NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (The Unitary State of the Republic of 
Indonesia). 
IX 
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party), chaired by Amin Rais, now 
chairperson of the MPR. In the Moluccas, the chairperson of PAN is Thamrin Ely, 
who actively initiated reconciliation between Muslims and Christians. 
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party), chaired by Yusril lhza Mahendra. 
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party). 
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party for 
Struggle), chaired by Megawati Soekamoputri, now President of Indonesia. 
PDKB Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Democratic Party for Love of the Nation). 
Pela Gandong Pela (Ind. Hubungan, alliance), Gandong (Ind. Sekandung, Kandungan, 
One's Mother's Womb). A local tradition of alliance amongst two or more clans, or 
ethnic and religious communities for preserving harmony and for mutual political 
and economic advantage. 
PGK Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar Party), used to be the mling party in the New 
Order. 
PGI Persatuan Gereja Indonesia (the Indonesian Church Association). 
PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party), now chaired by Hidayat Nur Wahid. 
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party), now chaired by Alwi 
Shihab. 
PKNI Partai Katolik Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Catholic Party). 
PKP Partai Kesatuan dan Persatuan (Unity Party). 
Poros Tengah (Central Axis), a coalition oflslamic parties in the Indonesian parliament 
comprising PPP, PAN, PBB, PK, and PNU. 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (The United Development Party), chaired by 
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Chapter One 
Approaches to the Study of the Ambon Conflict 
This thesis will discuss Muslim and Christian conflict in Ambon from 1999 to 2002. The 
roots of the conflict will be traced from the beginnings of Muslim and Christian 
interaction in the Ambon islands in the pre-colonial period up to the post-New Order 
period. Arab traders had a significant role in Islamising the indigenous (previously 
animist) Ambonese communities in the pre-colonial period. The colonial governments of 
the Portuguese and the Dutch were to later Christianise some of the same communities. 
The religious segregation and tensions of today date back to these periods. A sense of 
religious and ethnic harmony was only symbolically preserved during the New Order 
period under President Soeharto. Therefore, the ties among religious and ethnic groups 
were easily broken when Soeharto's regime collapsed in May 1998. 
This thesis will argue that the 1999 to 2002 conflict in the Ambonese islands was mainly 
caused by two factors: the long history of ethno-religious segregation in the islands and 
the emergence of a culture of thugs, gangs and laskars, called premanism, which had been 
utilised by certain elites since the New Order period to support their own vested interests. 
This thesis will analyse the conflict from both Muslim and Christian perspectives, whilst 
also allowing the 'voices from the ground' to be heard. The responses of both Muslim and 
Christian factions to the emergence of Jihad (holy war) movements in Java during 1999 
and Christians' response to the arrival in Ambon in 2000 of the radicalised Laskar Jihad 
will be surveyed. The views of radical Muslim groups will be ascertained and contrasted 
with the views of moderate Muslims concerning the conflict in order to fill in the gaps in 
scholarship to date. The responses to the conflict of Muslims at the national and central 
government levels will also be surveyed, highlighting the interaction of local and national 
politics in the post-Soeharto period. 
1.1 Background to the Conflict 
The Ambonese islands were once described as one of the beauty spots in Indonesia. It was 
regarded as an example of ethnic and religious harmony to be emulated by Indonesia's 
other multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations. The Ambonese islands played an 
important role in the historical development of Muslim and Christian relations in 
Indonesia. This has been especially so during the recent ethno-religious conflict. The 
conflict first erupted in this region and extended outwards to other areas. Its capital, 
Ambon city, played a central role in the conflict in that most of the groups engaged in the 
conflict managed their strategies from this location. The Ambonese islands form particular 
regency in the Central Moluccas. They incorporate 49 villages and border on the Ceram 
islands in the north, the Lease islands in the east, the Banda Sea in the south and the Buru 
islands in the west (See Figure 2). 
The Pela and Gandong tradition (later called Pela Gandong; Pela: Ind. Hubungan, 
alliance; Gandong: Ind. Kandungan, Sekandung, one's mother's womb), is a traditional 
custom in the Central Moluccas enabling ties between one or more clans, tribes or 
religions. It was one of the cultural methods used to solve social conflict in the Moluccas. 
However, this tradition was diluted in the 1990s under the New Order when Ambon 
became an industrialised city as a result of the New Order policy of 'go east'. 
Urbanisation and migration to this region grew significantly and impacted on the ratio of, 
and the relationships between, Muslims and Christians. In addition, in national politics the 
decline of Soeharto inspired the rise of a sense of regional identity, which resulted in an 
increasing local resistance to migrant or (outsider) communities. In Ambon, this resistance 
became evident in anti-migrant incidents occurring during 1998, a few months before the 
conflict erupted on 19 January 1999. This is popularly regarded as being the date when the 
conflict first erupted. However, there were already signs of tensions between indigenous 
Ambonese and migrants during 1998. 
The Ambon conflict is a special case when compared to Muslim-Christian conflicts in 
other parts oflndonesia, such as at Situbondo ( 1996), Tasikmalaya (1997), 
Rengasdengklok (1997), Kupang (1998), Western Kalimantan (1999) and Poso (1998-
2002). This is because of the long history of Muslim and Christian tensions in the 
Moluccas dating from the colonial period. Local politics has long been structured around 
ethno-religious divisions with contestation for political posts taking place on this basis. 
This had been the case under the Soeharto New Order. Importantly, as a result of the 
Ambon and other conflicts, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI, Tentara Nasional 
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Indonesia) were able to extend their territorial authority beyond Java in regions such as 
the Moluccas, Papua and Aceh. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Various observers have written about the conflict using a variety of approaches. Hartono 
Ahmad Jaiz ( 1999), a reporter with Media Dakwah and Peli ta, published an early book. It 
was a compilation of articles and reports from the Muslim media including Ummat, Media 
Dakwah, Sabili, Aliansi Keadilan, Amanat Nasional and Abadi. It also contained a few 
reports from more neutral media sources and from some Christian sources. Nonetheless, 
Jaiz's analysis was one-sided describing the conflict from a Muslim perspective. In the 
same year, Sinansari Ecip ( 1999), a Republika journalist, reported the Ambon conflict 
using a journalistic approach. Although Ecip drew on both Muslim and Christian sources 
and the national media, Ecip tended to be pro-Muslim and critical of Christians. Ecip's 
coverage was also limited in that it only described events up until September 1999. 
Brig-Gen (retired) Rustam Kastor (2000), one of the field leaders of Ambonese Muslims 
during the conflict, also wrote a provocative and one-sided account biased against 
Christians. Kastor (2000: 36) asserted that the conflict had been intentionally planned by 
the Christian-cum-separatists fighting for a Republic of South Moluccas (RMS). Kastor 
claimed that Christians had specifically targeted Muslims and estimated that about 90 per 
cent of those who had instigated the conflict had been Protestants (most Christians in the 
Moluccas are Protestants) (Kastor, 2000: 135-136). In fact, both Muslim and Christian 
communities had been involved in the conflict and both, to some extent, had instigated the 
violence, attacking each other and defending their own communities from attack. In his 
second book, published in August 2000 (six months after his first book), Kastor (2000a) 
defended the role of the Laskar Jihad in the conflict in helping local Muslims to defend 
themselves against the attacks of Christians. A strength of both ofKastor's analyses was 
use of local Muslim sources. However, Kastor was reluctant to use Christian sources. 
Elwin H. Al-Jakartaty (2000) also attempted to analyse the conflict by criticising the role 
of local and central governments in seeking to resolve the conflict. However, Al-Jakartaty 
only utilized very limited current media sources and a small number of books in order to 
look at the conflict from a historical perspective, which included discussion of the Pela 
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Gandong tradition. Freddy Pattiradjawane and Hamold Abel (2000) gave a descriptive 
account of the conflict with original colour pictures from the battlefield, especially in 
Muslim regions. They attempted to detail both Muslim and Christian views of the conflict. 
However, Pattiradjawane and Abel did not analyse the events nor did they include an 
adequate bibliography. Thus, with the exception of Ecip's book, publications dealing with 
the conflict from 1999 to 2000 were mostly intended for immediate publication and had 
very short preparation period. They offered poor analysis and used biased sources. 
On the other hand, in 2001 some more objective research was published. Among the more 
balanced analyses were an account of research conducted by a team from UPI (the 
Indonesian Science Institute) (2001) and a text by Trijono (2001). The UPI team (2001) 
analysed the roots of the violence in the Moluccas and North Moluccas. They confirmed 
that certain elements of the TNI had an interest in maintaining the status quo in order to 
expand their influence as a consequence of the riots (The UPI Team, 2001: 86-87). 
However, UPI research did not refer to local Muslim and Christian sources. Its sources 
were mostly based on national elite views as reported in the media, and on discussions in 
Jakarta. Similarly, Trijono (2001) gave a more balanced appraisal of the conflict based on 
involvement in attempts to resolve the conflict in Ambon. However, Trijono did not utilise 
the views of radical Muslims. Aditjondro (2001) analysed the Moluccas conflict based on 
interviews outside the Moluccas, and email and phone contacts with respondents in and 
outside the Moluccas, in other regions in Indonesia and overseas. Although Aditjondro 
attempted to give a balanced account, his lack of fieldwork caused him to misinterpret the 
role of the TNI in the conflict and that of the Muslim and Christian militias. Aditjondro 
did not consider that ethno-religious segregation in the Moluccas had been the prime cause 
of the conflict. Rather, he focused on the role of preman (or thugs), such as the Coker 
gangster, Agus Watimena's paramilitary and the Laskar Jihad, who were easily able to stir 
up both communities, as Tomagola (2001) has also pointed out. 
Another significant contribution was that by Van Klinken (2001). Using 'a communal 
contender' approach, Van Klinken suggested that the conflict was not purely the result of 
ethnic and religious divisions between Muslims and Christians. Rather, he portrayed it as a 
conflict between elites in local and national politics. In July 2001, a Jakarta-based NGO, 
TAP AK Ambon, published a book edited by Salampessy and Hussein, two young 
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Moluccan intellectuals. It was a compilation of human right activists' writings, which had 
been previously published in the national media along with some long articles, they had 
written for the book. It was an excellent attempt by indigenous Moluccans living in 
Jakarta to examine the conflict using social and political analysis. However, they did not 
consider the involvement of the Laskar Jihad and elements in the TNI nor the role of local 
and national elites, perhaps in deference to certain groups in Ambon and Jakarta. 
In contrast to previous studies, this study will examine the linkages between all the various 
factions in the conflict. It will cover both Muslim and Christian views from both local and 
national perspectives. How the various factions viewed the conflict will be important not 
only to understanding the roots of the conflict, but also to appraising the various 
approaches to reconciliation, which local non-governmental organizations and 
communities proposed as part of a bottom-up approach to conflict resolution. The analyses 
of previous observers will be considered. Regional politics during and after the conflict 
will be surveyed, especially with regard to the attempts by central authority to control 
regional government. 
1.3 Method 
This study will use an historical approach in analysing the relationship between Muslims 
and Christians to shed light on the dynamics of this relationship under the long experience 
of authoritarian rule up until the granting oflocal autonomy. The study is based on 
interviews with participants in the conflict, including people mostly in Ambon, some in 
Jakarta and Y ogyakarta. Many middle-class Moluccans lived in the Indonesian capital, 
Jakarta where various policies concerning the Ambon conflict and its resolution were 
discussed. Furthermore, Y ogyakarta was significant because the Laskar Jihad had its base 
in this city. 
This research will examine the conflict from two perspectives. The first regards ethno-
religious segregation as an important factor in shaping of the circumstances of the conflict 
and in enabling the continuation of conflict based on a politics of ethnicity. The second 
looks at premanism (or a thug culture), which became the instrument used by certain 
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elements in the State, including the security forces (TNI), to foster violence in the 
Moluccas. 
1.3.1 The Politics of Ethnicity 
A politics of ethnicity was exploited by both local and national elites in shaping the inter-
ethnic and inter-religious conflict. 'Ethnic conflict' can include religious conflict, but here 
a distinction will be made. For example, the BBM (Butonese, Buginese and Makassarese) 
are ethnic groups, which migrated to the Moluccas and from Java and Sumatra who also 
happen to be predominantly Muslim. Therefore, in this thesis the BBM means Muslim 
migrants as most Ambonese understand the acronym. From this perspective, Enloe's 
analysis of the ethnic conflict is helpful. She suggests that: 
The more common sorts of ethnically based conflicts will be those that involve 
competition for the rewards of economic and social development. And since a 
politically dominant ethnic group can control - through the machinery of the 
central government - the distribution of economic benefits, economic competition 
among ethnic groups will likely become political conflict as well (Enloe, in 
Pauker, Golay & Enloe, 1977: 142). 
The local elite gained advantages from the diversity of ethnic groups. During the conflict 
they mobilised around issues, which discriminated against certain ethnic groups. Religion 
was also utilised by the local elite to gain support in the lead-up to elections for governor, 
as well as in competition for public service positions (van Klinken, 2001: 2). Van Klinken 
interpreted the conflict 'as the result of an interaction between long-term "primordialist" 
social patterns and a short-term instrumentalisation of those patterns in the context of 
intra-elite competition at the local level' (2001: 2). At the national level, the elites played 
the ethnic card to ensure their dominance in central and regional relations. The autonomy 
of the regional government was contested during and after the conflict. 
1.3.2 The Politics of Violence and Premanism 
It has been alleged that the violence in Ambon was masterminded by certain groups at the 
national level and, to some extent, at the local level, in order that they might retain their 
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political advantage. Wessel's analysis of the politics of violence during the New Order 
period is important to understanding the Ambon conflict (Wessel, 2001 in Wessel and 
Wimhofer 2001: 64-81). In describing the New Order's violence, Wessel stated: 
The inbuilt mechanisms of the strong state included structural violence, which was 
closely connected over the years with the power of a small elite, with injustice, 
lack of fundamental human rights, discrimination, poverty, unemployment, 
economic oppression and the almost total absence of a rule of law. The power elite 
created and used laws to protect their interests and to enrich themselves (Wessel, 
2001: 72). 
The pattern of violence in the Ambon conflict was similar to the pattern of violence 
established under the New Order, which used third parties to instigate and continue the 
conflict. Aditjontro argues that there was strong evidence that 'the interwined military and 
militant Muslim network exploited the simmering ethno-religious tensions in Molucca 
using gangsters from Java and Ambon to trigger communal violence and ... Muslim 
militants' (Adijtondro, 2001 in Wessel and Wimhofer: 122; some additional information 
in Aditjondro, 2001 in Salampessy and Husein). As stated by Aditjondro himself, his 
analysis was based on library research, email and phone contacts and did not include first-
hand experience in the field of conflict (Aditjondro, 2001 in Salampessy and Husein: 135-
136). Additional analysis of Ambonese Muslim and Christian views in this thesis will 
substantiate his claim that the violence was politicised by a Jakarta elite to control power 
at the local level, and to ensure their political advantage at the national level. 
Furthermore, in the case of Ambon, available evidence suggests that it was state-
originated violence, which contributed not only to the continuation of the conflict, but also 
impacted upon the system of law and order in Ambon. Goodpaster (in Lindsey and Dick, 
2002) described the consequences of the long period of corruption, which existed during 
the Ambon conflict. Specifically, Goodpaster points to the role of police and military 
elements in funding the violence, whilst attempting to gain economic advantage as a 
consequence of the conflict (2002: 98-99). 
Lindsey's analysis of premanism is crusial to an understanding of the conflict. He shows 
how certain elites employed vigilante groups to inflate the conflict and how they gained 
economic privileges as a result (Lindsey, 2001 in Lloyd and Smith, 2001). Analyses by 
Aditjondro (2001) and Tomagola (2002) looking at the relations between the central elite 
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and the preman-laskar confirm Lindsey's assessment that both state and privately- funded 
premanism existed. 
Lindsey stated that: 
Derived from the Dutch for 'free man' and originally used to refer to irregular or 
demobilised soldiers, the term [preman] came to mean bandit and then gangster or, 
more commonly stand-over man. At times the term has overlapped with the }ago 
(literally, 'fighting cock'), the village 'tough' of ancient tradition who in an urban 
context became a gang boss; the rampok bandits; and the laskyar (militia or 
irregular forces) (Lindsey, 2001: 284). 
A culture of premanism existed during the New Order, when the premans were protected 
by state politicians and the military forces. This according to Lindsey was with the 
'dekking (backing) of an arm of the state' (Lindsey, 2001: 290). The conflict in Ambon 
illustrates how premanism has operated in the Reformasi period as a continuation of a long 
tradition shaped by the authoritarian regime of Soeharto. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis will be divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the general 
arguments of the thesis and indicates how it is different from preceding research. Chapter 
Two describes the context in Ambon before the conflict. It scrutinises ethno- religious 
segregation and the rivalry between Muslims and Christians in the context of national 
politics after the decline of the New Order. The third chapter examines the first phase of 
the conflict. In this chapter, the role of preman (thugs, gangster) in the conflict will be 
discussed in detail focussing on their relationship with the TNI and with local and national 
elites. Furthermore, the responses of the Muslim majority at the national level will be 
discussed. The fourth chapter will explore the second phase of the conflict, after the 
Laskar Jihad declared a Jihad (holy war) in the Moluccas. This chapter will highlight the 
response of Ambonese Christians to the Jihad. The role of the TNI in deploying the 
Las kar Jihad will be seen as a continuation of premanism dating back to 1999 when the 
conflict first began. The fifth chapter focuses on the resolution of the conflict. The 
attempts of Muslims and Christians to secure a peace in Ambon will be discussed in order 
to ascertain the future prospects for local politics. Finally, in the conclusion it is affirmed 
that the views of both Muslims and Christians concerning the conflict have to be taken 
into consideration so as to form a basis for reconciliation between the two communities. 
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Reflections on the concepts of ethno-religious segregation and premanism based on the 
Ambon experience will be presented. 
However, to understand contemporary developments, it is first necessary to examine 
Ambonese history and track the origins of ethnic and religious segregation back to the 
colonial period. Experiences of violence among Ambonese from the sixteenth century, 
through the colonial period and up to the twenty-first century, post-New Order period 
provide a backdrop to the recent conflict. In addition, the resolution of the conflict through 
application of the traditional Pela and Gandong cultural forms provide a fascinating 
window through which to view contemporary Ambon and to understand its tensions and 
challenges. 
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Chapter Two 
Ambonese Muslim and Christian Relations in Historical Context 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will survey the contact between Muslims and Christians in the Ambonese 
islands from the pre-colonial period to the revolutionary period of the late 1940s (just 
prior to national independence). Tracing this history will give us an understanding of the 
dynamics of Muslim and Christian relations under different regimes. This chapter will 
analyse the transmigration program under the New Order, which changed the composition 
of the population in the Ambonese islands from a position of Christian dominance in the 
1970s to one of Muslim domination in the 1990s. This change had a significant impact on 
local politics as Muslims gained access to more key roles. This chapter will also examine 
the origins of the Pela tradition and ethnic relationships based on the Pela tradition, noting 
the changes in this culture over time. It will argue that such cultural changes have 
impacted upon religious harmony in the region. Finally, this chapter will discuss the 
policies of the New Order regime and their impact on local politics. Generally, this 
chapter will argue that the long-term segregation of the Muslim and Christian 
communities shaped the tensions and competition between them. State violence and a 
culture of premanism during the New Order period caused frustrations amongst ordinary 
people. With the end of the authoritarian New Order regime and a new climate of freedom 
of expression, there was a growth in radicalism and illegal movements in the name of 
religion. 
2. 2 Early Contact Between Muslims and Christians in the Ambonese Islands 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, Islam had taken root in the Moluccas through the 
influence of Muslim traders. The first Islamised regions were Leihitu and Hatuhaha in the 
kingdoms ofTemate and Tidore, where the local people had both economic and political 
reasons to cooperate (Leirissa, 1975: 7). The Muslim kingdoms ofTemate and Tidore then 
Islamised the Ambonese islands from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the 
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seventeenth century. Islamisation continued more gradually after the coming of the 
Portuguese and Dutch (Cooley, 1973: 120). 
Cooley (1973) has noted that the coming of Islam resulted in changes in the local culture. 
In the indigenous marriage system, the required dowry was a human head as a symbol of 
individual prowess. This was later altered to rings, jewellery and other allowed items 
under the Islamic law system (Cooley, 1973: 121). Islamisation was to be challenged by 
the Christianisation of Ambonese communities by the Portuguese during the more than 
ninety years, from 1512 to 1605. The Portuguese brought Catholicism first to the Northern 
Moluccas, but encountered a significant challenge from Muslims. They subsequently 
succeeded in Christianising elites in the Central Moluccas, where there was less 
resistance. These elites, especially in the central part of the Moluccas on the Ambonese 
and Lease islands, had not been fully Islamised. 
When the Portuguese first arrived in the Moluccas, the Muslim Kings welcomed them and 
the trade they brought in cloves and other agricultural commodities. However, afterwards, 
because of differences over economic and religious issues, there were clashes between 
Moluccan Muslims and the Portuguese and later Dutch-cum-Moluccan Christians 
(Leirissa, 1975). 
Lestaluhu (1988) has detailed these clashes. The first was the Hitu War (1520-1605) 
between Moluccan Muslims and Portuguese-cum-Moluccan Christians. The Muslim-
Christian clashes continued until the coming of the Dutch in 1605. Soon after the Dutch 
arrival, some 16,000 Ambonese were baptised in the Leitimor and Lease islands in 1605 
(Chauvel, 1990: 18). The Dutch were to stay on for more than three hundred years until 
1942. The Dutch colonial government brought the Protestant religion, which also had 
influence in the central part of the Moluccas, especially as Dutch policy favoured 
Christians in gaining access to education and lower administrative positions in 
government. Chauvel described the discriminatory policy of the Dutch government toward 
Muslims as follows: 
After some hesitation, and the request from the Christian village leaders from 
Leitimor in 1607, the VOC [Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East 
India Company] adopted the policy that Christianity was seen as a means to 
promote the loyalty of the population to the Christian rulers. The VOC also 
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attempted, with limited success, to curb the process oflslamisation. Together with 
the destruction of the Ambonese Islamic 'states' and the elimination of the 
Moslem elite as independent political actors, this meant that the Moslem 
community was relegated to a subordinate position in colonial society compared 
with their Christian compatriots (Chauvel, 1990: 20). 
As a consequence of the conversions from animism to the monotheistic religions of Islam 
and Christianity, the indigenous cultures of the Ambonese underwent significant change. 
Cooley has stated religious institutions changed because of conversion and this influenced 
other aspects of custom and government (1973: 126). However, Cooley misinterpreted 
the impact of the new religions of Islam and Christianity on Ambonese, suggesting that 
the conversions took place because of their limited understanding of Islam and 
Christianity. The reality was that both religions tended to compete for adherents, who 
were basically searching to advance their own economic and political interests. 
The Dutch colonial government made Ambon town the centre of their administration in 
the Moluccas. Here the dominant Christian community had privileged access to jobs such 
as lower officers in the administration and especially as Moluccan soldiers in the 
Netherlands army in the East Indies. On the other hand, the Dutch destroyed the Muslims' 
clove trade in Temate and Leihitu, and did not give Muslims the opportunity to go to 
Dutch schools. This discriminatory policy impacted on the level of education that Muslims 
were able to attain. Muslims commonly had a lower level of education than Christians. 
This was the case over the long period of Dutch rule. 
Furthermore, the Japanese colonial government, after successfully defeating the 
combination of the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (KNIL, the Royal Dutch East 
Indies Army) and an Australian battalion on 31 January 1942, promulgated a new policy 
towards Muslims and Christians, which was contrary to that of the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990: 
1974). Muslims regarded the Japanese administration as having similar ideas to their own 
with respect to the Dutch. Moreover, Muslims gained positions of influence and the 
freedom to practice their religion, which was very different to the situation under the 
previous European governments (Chauvel, 1990: 184-185). Muslims did not realise that 
Japanese policy was intentionally aimed at destroying the power of previous regimes. It 
seemed to give privileges to Muslims to gain their sympathy and to underline to Christians 
that the Japanese colonial government had 'liberated' them from European control. 
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The role of Muslim and Christian organizations in the Japanese period was important in 
shaping a sense of nationalism and a sense of 'identity' as 'Indonesians' and 'Ambonese ' . 
With a different experience to their counterparts in Java, the independence movements in 
the Moluccas were moderate and had strong local political interests as their basis. On the 
other hand, Ambonese Muslims attempted to gain political control on behalf of 
Moluccans living outside the Moluccas. The Japanese colonial government succeeded to 
some extent in balancing the Muslim and Christian communities with implications for 
ethno-religious divisions. 
After independence, Moluccan Christians continued to hold top political positions in the 
Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT, State of Eastern Indonesia) up until the time when the 
Moluccas was given to the republicans in 1949. 1 In 1950, the Republic of South 
Moluccas (RMS) broke away, attempting to make the Moluccas separate and independent 
from Indonesia. Finally, the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia) defeated the RMS. Subsequently, separatists came under 
pressure as the central government of Indonesia set out to create a more balanced 
population of Muslims and Christians. The Christian majority in the Moluccas was seen 
by central government as posing a separatist threat. 
Certainly, the RMS separatist movement has had a long historical influence on Muslim 
and Christian relations. Soekamo's government saw the movement as a threat to national 
unity. Soekamo began a transmigration program whereby people from the heavily 
populated Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok regions were moved to the Moluccas and other 
islands (Hardjono, 1977: 25-26). Soekamo's transmigration policy was projected as 
supporting national security, as promoting national integration, and as remedying 
Indonesia's uneven population distribution (Goss, 1992: 87-88). Sainz called this a policy 
of' "Javanisation" of the Outer Islands as [a] means to achieve "national unity" against 
separatist tendencies' (1982: 10). Certainly, this policy served to reduce the emergence of 
1 The Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM), which has been associated with Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS) 
ideas of sovereignty, claimed that the United Nations' gift of the Moluccas to the Republic oflndonesia was 
illegal. They said that it was contrary to the spirit of the Linggarjati (25 March 1947), Renville (17 January 
1948) and Van Royen Room (7 May 1949) agreements (http://www.fkm-europa.nli? page=808, accessed on 
6 January 2003). 
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separatist movements in the Moluccas, by assimilating national traditions and by 
balancing the Christian and Muslim populations, as most transmigrants were Muslims. 
However, Soekarno also accommodated Christians by placing them in positions of 
political panel in the local government. 
2.3 The Dynamic of Pela in the Pre-Colonial and Colonial Periods 
The population of the Ambonese islands has been segregated since the pre-colonial 
period. As stated previously, the Muslims of Ternate and Tidore had successfully 
Islamised the Leihitu peninsula. However, in the Leitimor (later Ambon city) region, the 
inhabitants were originally animist-Hindus. The Portuguese converted the Leitimor 
Hindus to Catholicism and the Dutch converted the rest of the Hindus and a small number 
of Muslims and Catholics to Protestantism. Herein are the early roots of segregation in 
the Ambonese islands. The Dutch reinforced this segregation with their discriminatory 
policies against certain groups in the islands. 
The impact of segregation was reduced, however, by a treaty arrangement between the 
different communities that allowed friendships to be formed. This treaty was based on the 
Pela tradition. 'Pela' means 'brother' or 'trusted friend' and is a word originally from the 
Hoamoal peninsula (Ceram) and adopted into the Ambonese language. The original 
meaning of Pela was 'to be finished' (Bartels, 1978: 58). Pela tradition can be divided 
into three categmies: Pela Tuni or Pela Keras; Pela Tempat Sirih; and, Pela Gandong. 
Pela Tuni has two categories: Pela Tumpah Darah and Pela Batu Karang (Huwae, 1995: 
79). The further analysis will focus on the Pela Gandong tradition, which was prominent 
in discussion during reconciliation attempts in 1999-2002. The Pela Gandong tradition is 
an alliance of two or more people related by marriage, in which they agree to help each 
other based on family ties. For example, the Pela among the regions of the Tamilou, Siri-
Sori and Hutumuri2 was originally between three brothers from the village ofHatumeten 
2 During his fieldwork in Tamilou, Siri-Sori and Hutumuri, Huwae found the following rules mentioned by 
the inhabitants of the three regions: ' It is forbidden to become angry with a bongso [younger brothers or 
sisters]; it is forbidden to many a bongso; it is forbidden to refuse a request from a bongso; it is forbidden to 
lie to a bongso; it is forbidden to make fun of a bongso; One must help a bongso when (s)he is in trouble; 
One must help and support a bongso in busy and difficult times (weddings, deaths, etc.)' (Huwae, 1995 : 81). 
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on the island of Ceram, who decided to be in alliance after migrating to their new places 
in the three villages mentioned (Huwae, 1995: 80-81). 
Ironically, the oldest and existing Pela ceremony was not found in Ceram, but in the 
mountains of the Leitimur peninsula in Ambon. It was supposed that the Ceramese had 
adopted the tradition during a time of turbulence between Ambonese communities 
(Bartels, 1978: 80). The actual origins of Pela are blurred and there is a lack of strong 
historical evidence. According to Bartels, it was the subject of speculation in early 
European writings and not part of 'native explanations' (1978: 67). Furthermore, Bartels 
states that: 
Ambonese explanations of the origin of pela ... range ... from factual speculations 
to semi-mythical accounts. The first are based on historical factors but their 
elaboration is hampered by the still insufficient access of Ambonese to written 
historical records. In respect to the latter, it must be remembered that Ambonese, 
like other people, are ... curious about past events and their chronology. In such 
circumstances, history often becomes a justification [for] the present situation and 
[a] basis for ideology (Bartels, 1978: 72). 
The earliest Pela tradition was given brief mention in Ridjali's Hikayat Tanah Hitu, which 
Bartels ( 1978) considers to be the oldest written source discussing this alliance. In 1495, 
there was an unbreakable tie between the King ofTemate, Zainulabedien, and Pati Tuban, 
the ruler of Hi tu kingdom. They declared by a ceremonial oath that they along with their 
territories would have an eternal friendship and alliance. This pela was merely a 
promulgation of the raj a (king) of Hitumessen, which was accepted by the Hi tu people 
(Bartels, 1978: 73). However, during the Dutch period, the Hitu with the support of the 
Temate kingdom defended their interests in the face of Dutch pressure. The alliance was 
pragmatically employed by both rulers to preserve their political and economic interests. 
Subsequently, differences in policy regarding the Dutch arose between them. Temate 
adopted a non-aggression approach toward the Dutch. The Hitu lost their ties with the 
Temate kingdom. 
The Pela was also meant as a treaty between Muslims and Christians. It was probably not 
originally an inter-religious treaty, but because of the subsequent Christianisation of parts 
of the Ambonese islands by the Portuguese and Dutch, the treaty became an inter-religious 
one. This was a crucial development in the Pela tradition, especially in the first five or six 
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decades after the Dutch arrival (1605-1656). Many of the Pela alliances entered into 
between Muslims, non-Muslims and pagans have continued until today (Bartels, 1978: 
115). 
2.4 The New Order Centralisation of Development and Politics 
During the New Order period, the Pela Gandong tradition was merely a symbol of 
religious harmony in the Ambonese islands. It was promoted in tourism brochures by a 
national government proud of the harmony between multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
Indonesians. However, more transmigrants were coming to the Moluccas under the 
sponsorship of the central government so as to foster development, national unity and 
national defence and security (Goss, 1992: 88). Many came voluntarily from Java, 
Sumatra and Sulawesi to the transmigration projects in Ceram, other regions in the 
Moluccas and to the capital city of Ambon. In the capital, the proportion of Christians in 
the population changed from 60 per cent in the 1970s to 52 per cent in the 1990s. This was 
the result not only of a rise in the number of new Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese and 
Javanese migrants coming to the city, but was also the result of an increase in number of 
Ambonese Christians emigrating to Java after facing difficulties in finding work and 
making a living during the 1990s. Of course, non-indigenous Ambonese did not hold to 
the Pela tradition, which continued to influence the thought of young indigenous 
Ambonese. Transmigration and the growing urbanisation of indigenous Ambonese were 
important factors in bringing about a change in Ambonese culture during the 1990s. 
Ambonese culture was also drastically changed by of the New Order's centralisation of 
government. The traditional local leadership was remodelled along Javanese lines based 
around the concept of the lurah (head of village). In the longer term, the king and 
traditional leaders lost privileges and the respect of their communities. According to New 
Order policy, the only official political ideology was that of Pancasila. Soeharto succeeded 
in suppressing the power of local political figures, by eliminating the essence of their 
political identity and the basis for their power. 
However, local cultural expressions resurged after the fall of Soeharto. President 
Habibie's government gave more opportunities for local politics and local political 
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identities introduced a regional autonomy policy. Unfortunately, the euphoria of regional 
autonomy was to result in the strengthening of the indigenous community against 
migrants. Thus, the Ambon conflict can be seen as the product of regional political 
dynamics in this period of transition in Indonesian politics. 
In the city of Ambon, most Muslims live in the coastal areas around Batu Merah. They are 
migrants from South and Southeast Sulawesi, Java and Sumatra. Muslims also came to 
live in the middle of Christian areas in Ambon. As has been indicated, during the Colonial 
and the Soekarno periods Leitimor became a Christian region. However, the structure of 
the population changed once the New Order introduced its transmigration policy and open 
up Ambon city for Muslim urban settlement. Furthermore, the central government openly 
pushed this development as part of its ambitious transmigration policy. 
As these socio-political changes were occurring in Ambon, religion became an identity 
similar to race with respect to competition for local political and government positions and 
in the context of social policy. Muslims' perception of Christian domination in local 
government and in shaping public policy from colonial times to the second decade of the 
New Order government impelled local competition. On the other hand, Christians also 
perceived an Islamisation of the local bureaucracy to have occurred particularly during the 
last years of the New Order from 1992-1997.3 According to Shrieke, 'religious 
competition,' between Muslim and Christian 'races' became New Order policy in order to 
ensure the Moluccas remained under the control of the New Order regime (Schrieke in 
Azra 2002: xi) . The central government politicised issues relating to Muslim and Christian 
interests. Bureaucratic positions became a site of competition between the two 
communities. The elections for governor amplified political and religious divisions: if a 
Muslim became governor, then a Protestant had to be the vice-governor or secretary. 
In the context of such developments, there was a transfer of economic resources from 
local indigenous Ambonese to urban Muslims. Suparlan (2001: 8-9) suggested that the 
'unnatural' demographic change from Ambonese Christian dominance before the 1980s to 
3 Concerns were also evident at a national level regarding the tensions that were mounting in Ambon as a 
result of the changes that were taking place in the 1992-1997 period, particularly as a result of Christians' 
sense of marginalisation (Djiwandono 1999: 100-106). 
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migrant Muslim dominance in the 1990s was a cause of the conflict of Ambon. Suparlan 
used Bruner's model of 'the dominant culture' to explain the Ambonese situation: 
BBM people are dominant in the city of Ambon. From a demographic perspective, 
they are the majority compared to the indigenous Ambonese. Socially, 
economically and culturally, they dominate the public places and markets where 
the indigenous Ambonese are merely consumers; and politically both in the local 
and national arenas they have gained control in fashioning political policy and in 
determining natural resources distribution in Ambon and the Moluccas (Suparlan, 
2001: 8-9; translation mine). 
However, contrary to Suparlan's analysis, it was actually the Chinese and only a few 
middle-class Muslims, who dominated the retail market. The migrant Muslims (BBM) 
controlled only the traditional markets, which require a low level of labour skills and a 
limited capital. Middle and high-level investments were still controlled by the Chinese, 
Jakarta businessmen and foreign investors (Aditjondro, 2001). 
2.5 The Consequences of New Order Development in Ambon 
The centralization occurring under New Order development in the village of Soya Atas (as 
outlined in Pariela's (1996) study) is a good illustration of the impact of government 
development on adat (local culture). The Soya Atas village is one of the original villages 
in the five regions of Soya, a part of the Ambon city region. There are four new 
settlements at Kayu Putih, Batu Bulan, Karang Panjang Waihoka and Karang Panjang 
Puleh, where outsiders from a variety of ethnic groups, including Javanese, Butonese 
(Southeast Sulawesi), Chinese and Southeast Moluccas have lived (Pariela 1996: 108). 
Except for the Chinese, most outsiders were Muslims, who worked as traders and office 
workers (government and private), while Soya Atas villagers were mostly Christians. Soya 
Atas villagers were peasants who cultivated cloves, nutmeg and coconut cash crops as 
well as cassava, taro and sweet potato for household consumption (Pariela 1996: 108). 
Government development programs in this village gave advantages to outsiders rather 
than the indigenous population. Pariela explains that: 
Most of the development programs, in fact, were determined and funded by the 
government. Despite the fact that the Soya Atas people have enjoyed modem 
transportation and communication as the result of development programs, 
generally, these facilities seem to be useless especially in relation to pushing 
forward the economic activities of these people. This is because the facilities do 
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not themselves have a direct stimulation effect on the productive economic 
behaviour of the people (Pariela 1996: 117). 
The alienation the Soya Atas indigenous community experienced as result of New Order 
development parallelled that in other parts of Ambon. However, Pariela did not give any 
reasons as to why the indigenous Soya Atas people seemed to be reluctant to improve their 
agricultural practices, so as to compete with the Butonese migrants or to become traders 
like the outsiders. However, there were reasons why they did not do so. 
The transfer of land ownership from the indigenous Soya Atas people to the outsiders had 
an impact on consumption patterns. In making reference to Rostow's theory of 
consumption ( 1971) Pariela suggests that 'people had already jumped to the fifth stage of 
high mass consumption, whereas in fact, they were still living in the second stage 'the pre-
conditions for take-off(l996: 113). Indigenous Soya Atas people were described by 
Mearns (1996) being as 'lazy'. Mearns' analysis related the city of Ambon, where 
indigenous Ambonese worked as government officers and the outsiders (migrants) worked 
in the informal sector. He explained the situation as follows: 
Ambonese Christian self-representation during interviews and in conversations 
often has echoes of colonial myths of the 'lazy native' . Ambonese have said to me 
on many occasions that they generally prefer to work in offices, and government 
offices if possible. They have characterised themselves and their youths as lazy 
and disinclined to do manual labouring ... By contast, in terms of stereotyping, 
Ambonese Christians and Sulawesi migrants both represent the Butonese and 
Buginese to be much more inclined to take hard manual work and to be 
entrepreneurial and careful in the manner of earning their living (Mearns, 1996: 
99). 
However, both Mearns and Pariela were trapped into a stereotyping of indigenous and 
migrant (outsider) peoples and lost sight of the main problem of centralisation under the 
New Order. Soeharto's cronies exploited natural and mining resources and tragically 
controlled the price of that important agricultural product-Molucccan cloves. Indigenous 
Ambonese made gains in the peripheral commodity sectors and even in the government 
sector. However, the strategic political sectors were monitored by Soeharto's 
administration. Soeharto systematically constructed the segregation and stereotyping of 
the indigenous and the outsider communities through a policy of economic development, 
which defined the country according to industrial stages. Additionally, Mearns' argument 
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assigning Christians as being 'lazy natives' was contrary to the reality in Soya Atas. 
According to Pariela, Christians were hard-working peasants striving to make a living. 
In fact, many Muslims were equally poor and in a similar socio-economic category to 
Christians. They were also the victims of New Order development policy. Mearn's 
argument that Muslims had usurped Christians' domination in local politics, especially 
after Governor Akib Latuconsina's administration, assumed that this first Muslim 
governor in a Moluccas province had a policy of favouring Muslims. In fact, Latuconsina 
did not assist ordinary Muslims, but rather aided his clan and cronies (Irwan Patty, an 
interview in Ambon, 10 August 2002). 
The New Order development model in the Moluccas was based on a patrimonial structure, 
which had a patron-client relationship between the central elite as the patron and the local 
elite as the client (Leirissa, 2000). Leirissa stated that: 
During the New Order, the patrimonial relationship between central and local 
elites was well preserved, because they gained advantage from the alliance. The 
national elite channelled material advantages to the local region and, on the other 
hand, the local elite guaranteed the relationship for their own advantage (Leirissa, 
2000: 56). 
2.6 Ambon in The Post-Soeharto Transition Period 
The changing national politics after the fall of Soeharto and the political pressure on the 
Indonesian armed forces (TNI) to return to barracks was to impact on the situation in 
Ambon. The TNI attempted to adapt to the spirit of reformasi, which expected the security 
forces to become more professional and not be involved in politics. They were forced to 
restructure their organization. However, the rise in number of areas of conflict under 
reformasi and the transitional regimes from Habibie to Megawati has been linked by 
observers with a renewal of national security policy returning the TNI to a prominent role 
(Van Dijk, 2001; Haseman, 2002; Bhakti et al, 1999). 
The change in the role and structure of the TNI is one factor contributing to the outbreak 
of the conflict. However, changes in the local culture transiting from a traditional system 
to modernity also contributed to the continuance of the conflict. For example, within 
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Christianity and Islam, past religious practice was purified of its animistic elements and 
replaced by a monotheistic faith, which believes in one God. In the Makan Patita [a 
traditional meal] reconciliation ceremony, animistic practices such as the drinking of blood 
and praying to stone and wood is called Jahiliyah (barbaric, uncivilised) by Muslims 
(Muhammad At-Tamimy, an interview in Ambon, 4 August 2002) and is regarded as 
contrary to the Bible among Christians. Old animistic traditions have been displaced in 
favour of modem beliefs and a rational culture as pati of a process accommodating the 
demands of capitalism in a new Ambonese economy (Bartels 1977: 326). Particularly 
amongst younger generations, older animistic traditions have been forgotten. 
A further factor is the political instability, which occurred after the change in regime from 
Soeharto to B.J. Habibie. The fall of Soeharto led to wide-ranging reforms in the structure 
of national politics. The new national elite, which has emerged has a 'reform' approach to 
national policy and is favourably disposed towards the political accommodation of 
regional demands for autonomy. The centralisation of the New Order was replaced by a 
decentralisation accommodating demands that local (pribumi) human resources be fully 
utilised. The resurgence of local government created regional tensions. The filling of some 
bureaucratic positions by migrant people under the New Order had alienated indigenous 
Ambonese, who remained in the majority in the local government. 
The issue of the Islamisation of the government bureaucracy surfaced as a consequence of 
the important role played by ICMI in national politics from 1992 to 1997. A perception 
spread amongst Christians that an Islamisation of the local bureaucracy was occuring, 
while Muslims claimed that Christians had maintained their dominance. Under the Akib 
Latuconsina and Saleh Latuconsina governorships, some strategic positions in the 
government, traditionally in Christian hands, were transferred to Muslim hands, for 
example, the new head of the Department of Education and Culture was a Muslim. 
The impact of the Asian Financial crisis on Ambonese communities was actually not as 
severe as that experienced by other communities in Java. This was because the price of 
cloves increased over this period. Furthermore, during the conflict religious, ethnic and 
political identities interacted to varying degrees. In the early stages of the conflict, the 
issue of ethnicity dominated local politics. It influenced the political approach not only in 
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the period of the conflict, but also in the three years after the conflict. The local 
bureaucracy was in the hands of the 'sons of the soil' (pribumi, or indigenous) peoples. 
They took over the positions in the bureaucracy and the private sector previously held by 
migrants during the New Order. Therefore, as understood at the popular level, the conflict 
was the result of competition between indigenous Christian and Muslim urban 
communities over access to economic, political and social resources (Suparlan, 2001: 2). 
This competition was inflamed by the rhetoric used at the time. 
The term 'kotor' (dirty) was used of people who work in non-office and non-government 
jobs. Urban Muslims used this term before the conflict to describe rural Christian 
peasants. It was, as Mearns ( 1996) has described, a means of distinguishing Muslims and 
Christians in their work activities and economic culture. It contests Weber's finding of 
Protestantism's spirit of Capitalism. In Ambon, Muslims had a Capitalist spirit. It was, as 
Turner (1974) and Binder (1988) have described, an Islamic ideology and culture that was 
equivalent to the West's approach to development. 
Furthermore, the national tensions in the last decade of the New Order contributed to the 
tension in Ambon. Christians in Eastern Indonesia responded to the Situbondo and 
Tasikmalaya riots in 1996 and 1997 interpreting them as exemplifying a discrimination 
against minority Christian groups, which was condoned by the state. Then there were the 
riots in the Rengasdengklok, West Java, in 1997 followed by the Ketapang, Jakarta, riots 
in 1998. All of these riots were directed against Christians, who were assumed to playing a 
dominant role in the Indonesian economy. 
2.7 Conclusion 
A long-term segregation of the Muslim and Christians' communities existed in the 
Ambonese islands even before European settlement. For example, segregation existed 
between Islamised Ambonese on the Leihitu peninsula and the Leitimor community, who 
at that time embraced animism. The latter community then converted to Christianity 
during the Portuguese, and particularly during the Dutch, periods. The discriminatory 
policy of the Dutch disadvantaged Muslims and favoured Ambonese Christians 
economically and in terms of educational opportunities, widening the segregation gap. The 
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higher average level of education of the indigenous Ambonese compared with that of their 
Muslim counterparts enabled them to hold them political office and positions in the 
bureaucracy in the post-independence period. It was supposed that the Pela tradition was 
an important instrument, which could be used to harmonise both religious communities. 
However, the Pela tradition was originally not intended to reconcile religions, but was to 
be merely the basis of an alliance in times of war and a basis for economic cooperation 
between two or more negeris. However, the New Order used it as a symbol of the 
harmony between Muslims and Christians in the Ambonese islands. Thus, it was a fragile 
basis upon which to build strong relations. This became apparent with the change in the 
population structure as a result of the centralisation of government policy, especially 
during the New Order period, when large numbers oftransmigrants came from Java, 
Sumatra and Sulawesi to the Ambonese islands. 
The proportion of Muslims and Christians in the population changed from Christian 
domination in the 1970s to Muslim domination in the 1990s. This change was not only in 
terms of the overall population, but also increasingly paralleled the composition of the 
government bureaucracy in the central Moluccas. In Ambon city, the rise in 
transmigration and urbanisation marked by the coming of the Butonese, Buginese, 
Makassarese and Javanese migrants changed a Christian majority situation to one where 
there was more of a balance between the Muslim and Christian populations. In the last 
decade of the New Order, the Asian Financial Crisis and difficulties in the local economy 
impacted on Ambon city, resulting in the outbreak of anti-Christian riots in outside 
Ambon. This created a resistance in Ambon city amongst Christians against Muslims and 
against the central government. This resistance grew in the later period of the Soeharto 
regime and erupted into violence after the Soeharto regime fell. 
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Chapter Three 
The Conflict of 1999: Preman and Local- National Responses 
3.1 Introduction 
The Ambon conflict, which in official accounts erupted on 19 January 1999, raised a few 
questions as to whether the strife was purely a clash between grass-roots Muslims and 
Christians or whether it was, in fact, a contest between local and national elites, as Van 
Klinken has argued (2001 ). The actual causes are, of course, important in determining 
what the response to the conflict should be. The situation was compounded by the 
presence of a third group of 'provocateurs', who exploited the political tensions existing in 
the Moluccas from before the conflict. Furthermore, the role of elements in the Indonesian 
security forces (TNI) in inflaming and sustaining the conflict can be seen as the attempt by 
national players from Jakarta to gain political and economic advantages as a consequence 
of the conflict. The alleged former national ruling regime (Soeharto and his cronies) 
attempted to sustain its political power by creating riots and conflict; and, local elites in 
Ambon let the conflict go on as it was also to their political advantage to do so (Leirisa, 
2000: 56). Further, the 1999 national election was a significant event during the first year 
of the conflict, with Muslims alleging that the Christian elite had intentionally forced 
migrant Muslims to take refuge in the outer islands of the Moluccas to the political 
advantage of the Christians. Some Muslims from the PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, the United Development Party) in the Ambon parliament claimed that the 
victory of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party for 
Struggle, PDI-P) in Ambon was an unfair political result. Certainly, the Christians who 
dominated the PDI-P gained more advantage in local politics with the decline in the 
number of Muslim voters in the 1999 elections (ICG, 2002: 2; van Klinken, 2001). 
This chapter argues that the past and present ethno-religious segregation in Ambon was 
the main factor utilised by preman (thugs) to instigate and continue the conflict. They 
were able to exploit the tensions in local politics arising from the changing composition of 
the local population. This chapter will also argue that the local and national elites in order 
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to gain advantage from the conflict intentionally instigated the violence by supporting 
militia groups in both the Christian and Muslim communities. 
This chapter will be divided into three parts. First, it will examine the development of the 
conflict from December 1998, when the thugs first came to Ambon, up until December 
1999, before the mass rally at which the Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors) declared a Jihad 
(Holy War) in Ambon. In addition, this chapter will explore the relationship between the 
preman thugs) and local politics. Thirdly, it will discuss the provocateurs from the TNI 
and their possible role in the conflict. In this section, the alleged role of the TNI in 
supporting the preman will be observed from the end of 1998. Fourthly, it will examine 
the local politics in Ambon and the behaviour of political parties during the 1999 
elections. It will examine Muslim allegation that Christians were trying to get Muslims to 
leave the Moluccas. Discussions with local Muslims and Christians will be analysed to try 
and substantiate this allegation. Lastly the responses of Muslims and Christians outside 
the Moluccas is important to understanding the changing nature of the conflict, as 
emphasis turned from local to national issues as debates over the conflict were aired 
through the national media. The rise in tensions during the 1999 conflict, described by the 
national media, caused majority Muslims at the national level to seek to assist in 
protecting local Muslims from Christian attack in the spirit of Jihad (holy war). The 
resultant Jihad movements will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Four. However, 
first it is necessary to examine the dynamics of events occurring during the first year of 
the conflict. 
3.2 The Development of the Conflict 
Trijono (2001) divided the first phase of the conflict into three periods: January - early 
April 1999; the end of July - October 1999; and, November - December 1999. From April 
to July 1999, there was a relative period of peace, when local elites played influential roles 
in keeping the peace during the 1999 election period. Their political interests were best 
served by controlling the conflict and maintaining peace. After the results of the 1999 
elections were announced on July 1999, and the violence resurfaced again. 
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Trijono (2001), like other Ambonese Muslims (Kastor, 2000), claimed that the conflict 
had first begun in December 1998 in Dobo, Southeast Moluccas. Opposition to Butonese, 
Buginese and Makassarese (later called BBM) migrants was already in evidence in this 
conflict. During December 1998, the Ramadhan (fasting) month tensions over migrant 
BBM escalated. At 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 19 January 1999, the first day of Jedul Fitr, a 
celebration day for Muslims after a month of fasting, two youngsters from Batumerah and 
Mardika were involved in a fight. However, by 6 p.m., the clash had become a conflict 
between the two communities ofBatumerah and Mardika. By 9 p.m. the conflict extended 
to Batu Gantung, four kilometres from the location of the first riots. Here a crowd burned 
a small shop, a car and an elementary school in A.M. Sangaji and Anthony Ribhok streets 
(Gatra, 30 January 1999: 58). 
On the next day, 20 January 1999, the conflict became more widespread with fighting 
taking place between indigenous Ambonese, mostly Christians, and BBM migrants. 1 At 1 
a.m. on 20 January, Muslim and Christian groups were seen clashing in A.Y. Patty Street 
and in the streets separating Muslim and Christian residential areas near the Al Fattah 
mosque. In the city of Ambon, the markets of Batumerah, Mardika, Supermarket Peli ta, 
Gambus and the food market of Cakbar were burned. On the same day, conflict erupted in 
Benteng Karang, Pohon Pule, Paso, Nania, Hila, Negeri Lama, Hitu, Wailette, Kamiri and 
Hative Besar. The most dramatic conflict was at the bridge at Air Besar, where the 
Christians of Paso and surrounding areas confronted Muslims from Hi tu. Although 
conflict between the two communities was averted, during their return from Air Besar, 
Hitu Muslims burned houses and buildings from Benteng Karang to Nania (Gatra, 30 
January 1999: 58; Trijono, 2001: 44). By mid-day, the crowd (of Christians) were seen 
with the RMS (Republic of South Moluccas) flag, which has a basic colour of red with 
lines of white at the sides. The RMS flag was flown with two red and yellow gas balloons 
in the regions of Benteng Atas and Kudamati ( Gatra, 30 January 1999: 60). After two 
days, at least four hundred houses were burned and approximately twenty people dead, 
including children (Gatra, 30 January 1999:59). 
1 In a Gatra report, 30 January 1999, the term used was BBMS (Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese and 
Sumatran). It was supposed that Javanese were not included as BBM, but in fact, many Javanese Muslims 
were also involved in the conflict. 
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On the evening of 21January1999, the governor of the Moluccas, M. Saleh Latuconsina, 
Regiment Commander (Danrem) 174 Pattimura, Colonel Hikayat, and Commander of 
Lantamal (Landasan Utama Angkatan Laut) Moluccas-Irian Jaya area of command, 
Laksamana Muda Franky Kayhatu, met Christians in Tugu Trikora and Muslims at the Al-
Fattah mosque to seek reconciliation. After Colonel Hikayat made a statement that he 
guaranteed security at the Al-Fattah mosque, a nearby crowd suddenly attacked. The 
governor then declared that a curfew would be imposed (Gatra, 30 January 1999). In a 
few days, the conflict had extended to the Lease islands, Seram, Central Moluccas and 
Southeast Moluccas. In February 1999, conflict erupted in the islands of Seram, Haruku 
and Saparua (Trijono, 2001: 45). 
In March 1999, Muslims in Java and Makassar began to respond to the conflict, because 
of the numbers of casualties reported amongst Ambonese Muslims. It was on 1 March 
1999, that the bloody Morning Prayer (subuh berdarah) incident occurred in Ambon as 
reported in the national media. The Jakarta media indicated that the Muslims of Ahuru had 
been slaughtered in the mosque during Morning Prayer (Ummat, no. 35, 15 March 1999: 
22). Ten days later, 10-11March1999, Christians were reported as attacking Muslims in 
Air Salobar and Benteng Atas. These are two Muslim regions surrounded by a Christian 
population. Shortly thereafter, property was burned in Ponegoro, Kapahaha, Air Mata 
Cina and Pohon Pule following a clash between Muslims and Christians around the Silo 
church. In this clash, both Muslims and Christians had an equal number of casualties, at 
least twenty Muslims and Christians (Human Rights Watch, 1999). However, the national 
media reported Christians as attacking Muslims based on biased reports coming from 
Muslims in outside Ambonese islands. They had even assumed that Muslims were being 
cleansed from the islands. 
Therefore, the Crisis Centre of the Persatuan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia (POI, Indonesian 
Church Association) in the Moluccas released a statement following the national media 
reports of what had happened in the Moluccas, indicating that Moluccan Christians: 
strongly refuted every attempt to describe the Ambon riots as 'ethnic cleansing', as 
'religious cleansing', or as the 'slaughtering of certain religious communities' 
[Christian attacks against Muslims]. Such descriptions were being spread to incite 
a new hatred among religious people and give a false image not based on the facts 
of the Ambon riots (Ummat, no. 36, 22 March 1999: 17, translation mine). 
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During March 1999, Ambonese Muslim leaders also came to Java to seek help from their 
Muslim brothers. Some of them made claims and one-sided reports in order to find 
sympathy amongst Muslims outside the Moluccas (see further analysis later in this 
chapter). 
From April to July 1999, local politics brought about a change from conflict to relative 
peace. Local Ambonese Muslim politicians asked Muslim refugees in Makassar, South 
Sulawesi and Buton in Southeast Sulawesi to return to Ambon to strengthen the 
proportion of Muslim constituents in the city of Ambon for the 1999 elections (Ummat, 
no. 41, 26 April 1999: 30). The Komite Penanggulangan Krisis (KOMP AK, Committee 
for Crisis Recovery), coordinated by Tamsil Linrung, held a seminar in Makassar on the 
importance of Muslim refugees returning to Ambon in order to boost Muslim parties 
election chances. 
Figure 4. Map Showing Pre-conflict Religious Segregation 
in the Ambonese Islands2 (Ecip, 1999: 13). 
2 The symbols of the 'Crescent-star' (C) for Muslims and 'Cross' (+)for Christians indicate where the 
Ambonese Muslim and Christian communities were located (see also Figure 5: 32). The Pattimura 
University team created the map in Figure 5 (overleaf) before the Poka-Rumah Tiga conflict broke out on 
July 2000, which forced both Muslims and Christians into clearly designated areas divided along religious 
lines. Furthermore, many mixed Muslim and Christian regions, such as Poka and Nania, became segregated 
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After the elections, conflict erupted again on 23 July 1999, but this time in the Poka 
Complex, where the middle-class of Ambon live. Most were local government officers, 
lecturers and students at the Pattimura University, who had not been previously involved 
in the conflict since January 1999. Although the regions surrounding Poka like Nania, 
Negeri Lama, Hative Besar and Kawiri had experienced conflict, Poka had escaped it until 
July 1999 (Trijono, 2001: 47-48). In the Poka conflict, most of the victims were Muslims. 
This raised tensions in the Ambon city, which led to conflict on 27 July 1999 in the streets 
of A.Y. Paty, Sultan Babullah, Latuharhari, Pahlawan Revolusi, in the area ofTanah 
Lapang Kecil, and along the border of Waihaong and Talake. Similarly, in the peripheral 
regions of Ambon, such as Lateri I and Lateri III, conflict also broke out. On the next day, 
28 July 1999, conflict in the villages ofKisar, Pisang, Batugong and Hutumuri forced a 
total segregation of the population. In mixed population regions continued conflict forced 
both communities to make a door border between Muslim and Christian regions (Trijono, 
2001: 49). In later conflicts, the patterns leading up to conflict were similar: after the 
spreading of rumours, tensions rose leading to violence. For example, in October 1999, 
conflict in the North Moluccas led to tensions, which resulted in conflict in Ambon around 
Tugu Trikora on 26 December 1999 with the burning of the Silo Church and the An-Nur 
mosque - two important symbols for Ambonese Christians and Muslims. 
Preman (thugs) and paramilitary groups, as well as elements in the Indonesian armed 
forces and police force, have been alleged to have played key roles in instigating and 
continuing the conflict in 1999. Their relationship with Indonesian politics was a crucial 
factor. 
Muslim and Christian regions. For example, Poka has been since inhabited by Muslims only and Nania is 
now a Christian-only region. (For further discussion, see Chapter Four.) 
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Figure 5. Map of Religious Segregation and Conflict in 
the Ambonese Islands in 1999 (GPM, 2002). 
3.3 The Premans and Politics 
The history of preman (thug) activity in Indonesian politics must be considered so as to 
understand thug behaviour in Ketapang, Jakarta, and their subsequent influence on the 
Ambon conflict with the possible support of the State (including elements in the 
Indonesian armed forces) . Lindsey (2001) refers to 'state ' and 'private' premanism and 
includes the Laskar Jihad as a type of private premanism. As stated in Chapter Two the 
preman (thugs, gangsters, laskar, paramilitary) were common in city areas during the New 
Order period. Thus, they had a prior history and did not just suddenly appear during the 
conflict in Ambon. Local c01mnunities and the government described the preman as 
'provocateurs' for the reason that they inflamed the conflict in Ambon by spreading false 
rumours. Munir defines 'the provocateur' in Ambon as 'someone who spreads false 
infonnation to the community with the intent of creating conflict ... serving political 
interests in the wider context' (Munir, 2000 in Aditjondro & Anggoro: 62). Provocateurs 
also participated in the conduct of the violence in Ambon. 
During the revolutionary period (1945-1949), preman were often heroes in the 
independence struggle. They were also a criminal and political machine during the New 
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Order period (1965-1998). Cribb (1991) has comprehensively described the role of Jakarta 
gangs during the revolutionary period when Indonesia was fighting for its independence. 
They created their own groups and took part in defending Jakarta, along with the 
republican military, against the Dutch colonial government. Moving to the New Order, 
preman were utilized by the ruling regime to maintain its power by breaking up the 
opposition. Megawati's PDI, for example, was seen by Soeharto as a potent opposition 
against his power. In July 1996, Soeharto sent thugs to attack the official PDI office on 
Diponegoro Street in central Jakarta. In this violence, five people died and over twenty 
others disappeared (Elson, 2002, in Colombijn and Lindblad eds., 2002: 190). 
It was common in Jakarta that the preman would guard entertainment centres such as 
discotheques and casinos. In Ketapang, Petojo, Central Jakarta on 21November1998, 
preman of Ambonese origin who were guarding the entertainment centre clashed with the 
local community of Ketapang. Shortly after the clash, rumours of mosques having been 
burned by Ambonese spread quickly causing anger in the (mostly Muslim) local 
community. In fact, a local mosque was attacked by the preman and the Muslim 
community was intimidated and beaten up. Muslims reacted by burning churches and the 
clash escalated into Muslim and Christian riots, leaving sixteen people dead and more than 
five hundred injured. Sixteen churches and a mosque were destroyed (Sihbudi & 
Nurhasim, 2001: 45). Jakarta preman were provocateurs in the early stages of the conflict 
in Arnbon, 19-23 January 1999, for example, in the conflict around the Al-Fattah mosque 
on 20 January 1999. The Jakarta Ambonese preman who came to Ambon were led by 
Milton Pieters. This group brought handy-talkies,3 while other unidentified people also 
had hand-phones. They seemed well-organised during the riots (Kontras, 1999: 11). 
Before continuing the story of the preman deployment by the Jakarta elite to Arnbon and 
other islands in Eastern Indonesia, it is important to assess the possible links between the 
3 Dming my fieldwork in Ambon, handy-talkies were easy to find at the cheap price of around seventy 
thousand Rupiah (around fifteen dollars Australia) per set. During my interview in Galunggung with a local 
Muslim militia, Alfa (not his real name), a commander of local Muslim militia, along with Ahmad Ibrahim 
(not his real name)- a Javanese and a member of the Laskar Jihad- offered to buy me and my research 
assistant a new handy-talky. During the conflict Ibrahim had organised an illegal smuggling business 
dealing in such items in conjunction with elements in the Indonesian armed forces (Ahmad Ibrahim, an 
interview in Ambon, 29 July 2002). Certainly, some militia members and some elites found ways of gaining 
an economic advantage during the difficulties of the monetary crisis through involvement in this kind of 
illegal business. 
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Ambonese preman in Jakarta and Soeharto cronies. The Ambonese preman had been 
behind the riots in Kupang, Nusa Tenggara Timur and previously had been in Ketapang, 
Jakarta. It has been alleged that they had been utilised by elements in the TNI and by 
Soeharto cronies to instigate riots and to create instability in various parts of Indonesia. In 
Ambon, the preman from Jakarta got involved with local preman (Aditjondro, 2001 a, in 
Salampessy and Hussein: 43; Let. Col. Hasanusi, an interview in Ambon, 5 August 2002). 
The mayor of Jakarta sent hundreds Ambonese preman home in order to secure Jakarta, 
amidst the continuing conflict after the deaths of some Christian Ambonese in the 
Ketapang riots. However, during their return on the state-owned ship, Dobonsolo, the 
preman planned to take revenge on Muslims in the Moluccas (Muhammad Yunus, shared 
this information in Ambon, 2 August 2002). The Moluccas government accepted the 
return of the Ambonese Jakarta-based gangsters to Ambon. However, they did not have 
adequate security preparations in place. On the other hand, tensions increased in Ambon 
with the return of the thugs and rumours of their intent to revenge the death of Christians 
in Ketapang by forcing migrant (Muslims) away from the Moluccas (Hasanusi, an 
interview in Ambon, 5 August 2002). The Jakarta thugs united with local gangs to operate 
in both Muslim and Christian regions. 
In turning to analyse the relationship between Jakarta and local Ambonese preman, there 
is clear evidence of a link. The localpreman commander-in-chief, Agus Wattimena (50, d. 
2001 ), organized at least five thousand militant Christians to declare a war against 
Muslims. Wattimena moulded his militia into a Laskar Kristus (Christ Militia Force) 
against the Laskar Jihad in 2000 (a detailed analysis appears in Chapter Four). Wattimena 
headed a local Christian militia, which was in competition with another preman group, 
commanded by Berty Loupatty, which was called Coker ( Cowok-Cowok Keren, 
Handsome Boys).4 Wattimena and Loupatty had competed since the 1980s through their 
Christian-dominated gangster groups (Tempo, 19 May 2002: 32). Loupatty had united the 
local gangs: Van Boomen, Papi Coret and Sex Pistol into one group, called Coker with 
both Christian and Muslim members. However, after the conflict erupted, Coker members 
divided into two religious camps, which were active in both Muslim and Christian 
4 Coker also meant Cowok-Cowok Kerempeng (Thin Boys) and Cowok-Cowok Kristen (Christian Boys). 
The latter meaning was from a Muslim perspective, because most the Coker members were Christians. 
Muslims also assumed that the Coker supported Christians against Muslims. In fact, the Coker's operations 
disadvantaged both Muslims and Ch1istians. 
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communities (Tempo, 19 May 2002: 32; Tempo, 26 May 2002: 25). The Coker 
represented Jakarta interests in the conflict. Whereas, Wattimena founded his Christian 
militia to fight against Muslims and was financially supported by some Christian 
businessmen and priests (Tempo, 19 May 2002). Their reasons for supporting such a 
militia are unclear, but like other middle-class Ambonese, they needed protection for their 
business assets and a means of forging Christian solidarity. 
The Coker gang was allegedly involved in planting some explosive material, for example, 
in the Paulus church in the Kudamati area (Tempo, 17 May 2002). Detective chief of 
Pattimura military command, Lt. Colonel Irwansyah and a Christian leader, Emang 
Nikijuluw, said that Loupatty was instrumented by some elements in Kopassus to create 
violence in both the Muslim and Christian communities (Tempo, 17 May 2002). Coker 
members held in the Brimob detention centre in Jakarta confirmed these allegations. 
Right from the early stages of conflict, the preman had been involved in playing up certain 
issues, raising anger in both communities through burning buildings, spreading pamphlets 
and making phone calls to pass on certain information, which would inflame Muslim or 
Christian sentiments. Such information stereotyped certain ethnic and religious groups. 
This pattern of instigating riots and violence had been commonplace since the New Order 
and especially during the last decade of Soeharto period.5 Provocateurs6 were regarded by 
local people as behaving like hantu (ghosts). They were difficult to detect by ordinary 
people, but their presence can be discerned by looking at the larger pattern of conflict. 
People might not know who the individual group members were, but they planted bombs, 
burned buildings and killed people in a systematic manner (Kontras, 1999: 8-9). 
There have been two versions describing the role preman played in instigating the early 
conflict. The first was published by the Gereja Protestan Maluku (GPM, Moluccan 
Protestant Church). It alleged that a Christian driver, Jacob Lauhery, popularly called 
5 For good picture of such violence during the New Order, refer: (Joshua Barker 2001:20-54). 
6 Munir described provocateurs as being in one of four categories. First, the provocateur as the leaders of 
demonstrations. Second, those who empowered labour movements and other community groups. This type 
was commonly by stigmatised by Soeharto's New Order. Third is the group, which creates issues and 
spreads dis-rumours to instigate conflicts. This group can be seen in the Ambon conflict. Fourth, 
unidentified groups, which agitated around the problems of economic disparity and poverty (Munir 2000: 
59; also for an interesting comparison, see Sulistyo, 2000: 65). 
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Y opy, was confronted by Nursalim Bugis (or Mohammad Bugis ), a Buginese Muslim 
thug carrying a machete, who demanded that Y opy give him money. However, Y opy 
refused to do so. Y opy later invited his Christian Mardika friends to find Nursalim in 
Batumerah. However, they did not find him. Some fifteen minutes later, there were 
hundreds people with weapons from Batumerah looking for Y opy. They became frustrated 
when they did not find him. Thus, they burned the properties of Y opy' s neighbours. 
Batumerah Muslims confirmed that they did not know the groups that supposedly had 
come from Batumerah. The head of police in Indonesia, Let. Gen. (Pol.) Roesmanhadi, 
confirmed this version (Trijono 2001: 38-39; Kontras, 1999: 3). It was alleged that Bugis 
was part of Ambonese Jakarta gangsters inflaming in Ambon (Johanes, an interview in 
Ambon, 2 August 2002). 
The second version as reported by a Muslim Fact Finding Team indicated that Bugis, an 
assistant driver, had asked Y opy to pay the fare. However, Y opy refused and invited his 
Mardika friends to confront Bugis's group. Inevitably, a clash between the Muslim and 
Christian youths ensued (Trijono 2001: 40). However, Kontras and the national media did 
not mention this version (Kontras, 1999: 3). 
What happened in Mardika was actually common in Ambon. Ambonese were confused as 
to the origin of the Batumerah groups, which inflamed the Mardika Christians to anger 
after the burning of their houses. On the other hand, Mardika Christians observed the 
presence of Christian groups, which they could not identify. Both the Muslim and 
Christian communities thought that the groups were from outside of their villages. Some 
observers identified the groups as the provocateurs, who had been linked with Jakarta 
since 1998 (Trijono 2001; Van Klinken 2001; Aditjondro 2000; Munir 2000). There were 
about 800 thug members who went from Jakarta to Kupang, Makassar, Menado and 
Ambon. Such groups failed to stir violence in Kupang and were refused access by local 
authorities in Menado and Makassar. However, the Moluccan government accepted them 
for the reason they were of Ambonese origin (Colonel H.R. Hasanusi, a police officer and 
a former chief of MUI Ambon, an interview in Ambon, August 2002). 
During the conflict, people made assumptions concerning the involvement of the different 
groups. For example, who were the first instigators in the conflict? Christians assumed 
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that those initially burning Christians' houses were Muslims, while Muslims assumed that 
Christians had initiated the violence. 7 The uncertainty fuelled anti-Christian sentiment of 
among Muslims and anti-Muslim sentiment among Christians. For example, the issue of 
the burning of the Al-Fattah mosque in Ambon city inflamed Muslims during the early 
stages of the conflict, even hundreds of kilometres from Ambon, Leihitu. Muslims came 
voluntarily in a large group to Ambon to defend Muslims from Christian attack. 8 
Ambonese came to recognise the role of the provocateur in inciting the violence. 
However, the involvement of the Leihitu Muslim communities was closely linked to the 
long-term anti-Christian sentiment caused by the existing Christian domination in the 
government bureaucracy. One of reasons Leihitu Muslims were so ready to attack 
Christians was because of their sense of alienation as a result, for example, of the 
recruitment of Christians as local government officers and the appointment of largely 
Christian staff at the Pattimura University.9 Certainly, provocateurs also played on such 
sentiments in inciting local Leihitu and Ambonese Muslims against Christians. 
3.4 The Provocateurs from the TNI 
The Coker gang was a close ally of the Jakarta-based Ambonese gang led by Milton 
Pieters, who it is alleged had a connection with the Soeharto family. Berty Loupatty, the 
leader of the Coker gang, also, it seems, had gained the protection of the Special Armed 
Forces (Kopassus) in Ambon. This was made clear after the capture of Loupatty by police 
officers. Kopassus subsequently took over the investigation after it clashed in 2002 with 
police officers over who would 'protect' Loupatty. They appear to have let Loupatty and 
his Coker members go around in West Papua. Finally, Loupatty and members of his group 
7 Christian leaders challenged the allegation that Christians had instigated the conflict, while they insisted 
that the first home burned belonged to Christians (Semi Titaley, an interview in Ambon, August 2002; also 
similar arguments from other Protestant priests and intellectuals (John Ruhulesin, Pdt. Agus and Tony 
Pariela, personal communications on different occasions, July-August 2002)); However, some Muslims 
believed Cluistians instigated the conflict in order to get them to leave the Moluccas, especially migrant 
Muslims (Abdurrahman Kew, a MUI member of Ambon, a personal interview in Ambon, August 2002). 
8 The issues were not clear to Leihitu people, however their religious zeal to help Ambonese Muslims 
outweighed any need for proof of the claims. However, after a while (by the end of 1999), Leihitu people 
became more careful of blindly accepting the information in pamphlets and phone calls (King of Hitumesen, 
an interview in Ambon, August 2002). 
9 As Pattimura University is in Poka, Leihitu islands, which is mostly inhabited by Muslims, Muslims 
complained about this Christian domination. Therefore, the Muslims of Leihitu preferred to send their 
children to study in Makassar and Java (King ofHitumesen, an interview in Ambon, August 2002). 
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were arrested in Jakarta in November 2002. Allegations regarding the role of Coker and 
other third parties in the conflict have subsequently been made. 
The conflict aided the armed forces in developing new territory under its influence. They 
had a plan to open a new territorial structure two months after the Moluccas conflict. In 
March 1999, General Subagyo, the Army Chief-of-staff, stated that the army's territorial 
structure would be broadened from ten to seventeen Kodam in responding to the demand 
for national security, especially in the troubled regions: Aceh, East Kalimantan, Moluccas 
and Irian Jaya. 10 There was, though, an apparent link observed between the rise in conflict 
and a decline in government prosecution of Soeharto and New Order cronies. Some of the 
significant issues included accusations against Wiranto with regard to East Timor human 
rights violations and the rise in demands from Jakarta politicians to prosecute Suharto 
cronies, especially during the later stages of Wahid's government. 
Instability and tensions existed from November 1998 to January 1999 immediately 
following the 'sending' of gang members to Ambon after the riots in Ketapang, Jakarta. 
This is the first theory, which connects the conflict with the Jakarta elite. In the middle of 
November 1998, the first riots took place in Kampung Wailette, the village of Hative 
Besar, the district ofTeluk Ambon Baguala, Ambon city, where 34 houses were 
destroyed. On 14 January 1999, the similar tensions erupted in Dobo, which left sixteen 
people dead and many houses burnt. However, during the riots the security forces were 
hesitant to intervene (Koutras, 1999: 4). It was as a result of these riots and the 
accumulation of tensions after the burning of churches in Java from 1996-1998, that anti-
migrant sentiment grew in Ambon. The independent, Jakarta-based human rights NGO, 
Koutras (1999: 4) concluded that these riots had been 'dimainkan' (played) by third 
groups in coordination with the elements of the security forces to incite the anti-migrant 
and anti-Muslim sentiment in the lead-up to 19 January 1999, which was the date of Iedul 
Fitri 1999 - a strategic time to stir up tensions. It was the unconfirmed and suspect 
accounts of early conflict among Ambonese that provided the backdrop to the quarrel 
between a Christian youth of Mardika and a Muslim youth of Batumerah, causing it to 
quickly escalate into ethno-religious conflict between Muslims and Christians. 
10 The new Kodam would impact favourably on the rise of some TNI elite (The editors 1999: 145). 
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Local community members also attest to witnessing armed forces members from both the 
police and the military using standard militaiy weapons to kill people from particular 
groups. Kostrad (the Strategic Command of Armed Forces) seemed to be pro-Christian 
and the armed forces (TNI) pro-Muslim. This was because many local police members are 
Christians and, thus, supported the Christians. However, among Muslim police officers, 
there were also those who actively supported Muslims at times during the conflict, 
although they were small in number (Johanes, an interview in Ambon, 5 August 2002; 
Abdulgani Fabanyo, an interview in Ambon, 29 July 2002). 
Thus, some observers (Munir 2000; Trijono 2001) argue that the provocateurs included 
elements from the police and armed forces as well as gang members. The provocateurs 
were said to have been utilised by the Jakarta elite to create tensions in the Moluccas. Ir. 
Gen. Firman Gani, former head of Police in the Moluccas from June 2000 to May 2001 
and then moved to become head of Police in South Sulawesi, admitted that some of his 
staff were involved in the conflict. Muslim police officers had apparently supported 
Ambonese Muslims in attacking Christians, while Christian police officers similarly were 
said to have supported Ambonese Christians against Muslims. Gani said that such 
involvement would have been understandable based on a desire to help their family, 
neighbours and colleagues during the conflict (Gani 2002: 78-79). However, on many 
occasions they are alleged to have instigated the clash by shooting at the other community 
and then allowing the charged emotions to cause people to take out their grievances on the 
other community. 11 
The involvement of TNI elements was analysed by Thamrin Ely, a chief of the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) of the Moluccas. Ely stated that there were four factors in the 
conflict: the role of Soeharto and his cronies; the role of the TNI; the analysis of 
observers; and, the tendency of local Ambonese to respond to the conflict through 
violence (Suaedy et al. 2000: 24-25). Based on his evidence, Ely stated that during the 
conflict, the violence and mass killings were systematically organised in the same manner 
11 For example, in the burning of the Silo church, armed forces and police officers were alleged to have 
started shooting from the Al-Fattah mosque towards the Silo church, which was guarded by Christian police 
officers and armed forces staff. Furthermore, Muslims with the alleged support of armed forces members 
and police officers went and burned the Silo Church (Abdulgani Fabanyo, An interview in Ambon, 18 
August 2002). 
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as the violence under the New Order. For example, local communities could not 
communicate by phone, mobile phone and fax when the riots broke out in their areas. 
Thus, information channels were being blocked to prevent the local community quickly 
informing outsiders of what was taking place (Suaedy et al. 2000). 
The roles of thugs and security force elements in inflaming the conflict by spreading false 
infmmation to ordinary Muslim and Christian communities, blocking communications to 
and from Ambon and intentionally provoking both groups strongly pointed to connection 
with outside factors from Jakarta. However, the local elite also played pivotal roles 
thereby getting political advantage during the conflict. Both Van Klinken (2001) and 
Tomagola (2002) argued that there were linkages based on vested interests between the 
security forces, thugs and local and national political elites during the conflict. The 
interviews conducted as part of this study would seem to support such allegations. 
3.5 The Role of Local Politics and Political Parties 
In Ambon city, local Muslims alleged a conspiracy between the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) and Christians in order 
to gain political advantage from the conflict in the lead-up to the 1999 elections. Christian 
leaders and parliamentary members refuted this allegation. On the other hand, they 
claimed that Muslims had attempted to instigate in the conflict and that the Christians' 
response was merely to defend their homeland from outsiders' attacks (Semy Titaley, an 
interview in Ambon, August 2002). They claimed that any political advantage gained by 
Christians was coincidental, following the return of migrant Muslims to their homes 
elsewhere. A Christian parliamentary member claimed that the 1999 election result was a 
positive result allowing indigenous Ambonese to control local politics (Rony, a PDI-P 
Parliament member, an interview in Ambon, August 2002). Table 1 (p. 40) and Figure 6 
(p. 40) describe the total votes won by the ten largest parties in the 1999 elections in 
Ambon city. The PDI-P, a nationalist party dominated by Christians in Ambon, gained 
twice the votes of the former New Order party, Golkar. However, Muslim parties like PPP 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the United Development Party), PK (Partai Keadilan, 
the Justice Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, the Crescent Star Party), PAN (Partai 
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Amanat Nasional, the National Mandate Party) and PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, the 
National Awakening Party) gained few seats. Although PPP had attempted to form an 
alliance with PBB, they won three times less votes than the PDI-P, which had an alliance 
with the PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa, the Democratic Party for Love of the 
Nation), a Christian-based party (Figure 6:40). This demonstrates the clear win by 
Christians in the 1999 elections in Ambon city. However, this did not sit well with central 
government policy. Under the existing civil emergency, Jakarta retained M. Saleh 
Latuconsina, as governor. He had been loyal to the ruling central government in the 
transition from Habibie to Megawati as President. Real power, however, was in the hands 
of armed forces during the conflict. Thus, some have claimed that the emergency was 
more military than civil in nature. The dominance of PDI-P in the local parliament 
allowed national government more sway in local politics after the conflict. 
According to some Muslim parliamentary members from Ambon, the voice for freedom 
and democracy in Muslim regions was not accommodated during the 1999 elections in 
Ambon. Actually, the appearance of new parties like PBB, PK, PKB and PAN had given 
Ambonese Muslims people hope of representation and pluralism. However, Muslims 
finally agreed to channel their vote to the PPP, which had been recognised in the 
Moluccas since the New Order as the only real alternative choice for Muslim voters. On 
the other hand, the Protestant and Catholic churches played a prominent role in persuading 
Christians to allocate their votes to the PDI-P, achieving a successful result placing PDI-P 
representatives in both local and national parliaments. Muslims had multiple 
disadvantages during the 1999 elections: the decline in numbers of Muslim voters; the 
lack of Muslim leadership among the various fractions; and, a lower level of political 
d Chri . 12 awareness compare to stians. 
12 Interviews with Muslim parliamentary members from the PBB, PPP and Golkar parties in Ambon, August 
2002. 
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Table l. The 1999 Election Result for Am bon city (BPS of Ambon, 2000) 
ipARTY DPR DPRJ DPR2 
lPDl -P 68826 64292 63251 
PGK 24652 23131 23453 
PPP 18696 20493 20546 
PDKB 2308 4442 4187 
PBB 2438 2496 2448 
PKP13 1955 1944 2100 
PKNI14 1222 1521 1693 
lPAN 1494 1049 1079 
lPKB 891 917 937 
PDJ1 5 751 829 868 
Figure 6. Bar Chart Showing the 1999 Election Results 
in Ambon city (BPS of Ambon, 2000) 
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Based on the 1999 election experience, it can be concluded that local elites influenced 
Muslim and Christian participation in the elections. Certainly, local Christians expected to 
gain political advantage. On the other hand, Muslim elites after shocking results of the 
elections again provoked local Muslims to seek better concessions. Therefore, it was 
inevitable that Muslim and Christian communities took up the conflict once again from the 
13 Partai Kesatuan dan Persatuan (Unitary and Unity Party). 
14 Partai Katolik Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Catholic Party). 
15 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party). 
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the end of July 1999 onwards. Furthermore, the national media reported and interpreted 
the debate among Ambonese and non-Ambonese communities concerning the conflict. 
Obviously, the Jakarta-based Muslim media gave a biased analysis of the conflict, which 
led Muslims outside Ambon to declare a Jihad in Ambon. 
3.6 Discussion in the National Media 
A month after the conflict began, the views of Muslims and Christians, both in and_ outside 
the Moluccas, were being debated in the national media. Discussion centred around 
whether it was a religious, ethnic or political conflict; what was behind the conflict; and 
how Ambonese Muslims and Christians had manipulated the conflict. Saleh Latuconsina, 
the governor of the Moluccas and a Muslim, stated that the conflict in Ambon was 
between indigenous Ambonese, BBM migrants and the Javanese for the following 
reasons: 
[Firstly], it was the result of a social gap, caused by difficulties in finding jobs. The 
Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese and Javanese ethnic groups dominated in the 
economic sector, in which indigenous Ambonese had not been interested in getting 
involved ... [secondly], there were intellectual actors in the government, who 
sought certain advantages by systematically poisoning the minds of ordinary 
people ... In fact, the people had never thought that having either a Muslim or 
Christian leader was a problem (Ummat, no. 35, 15 March 1999: 26, translation 
mine). 
Latuconsina's view was contrary to that of other Muslims, who claimed it was a religious 
conflict because Christians had initiated the attack on Muslims. Among them was Umar 
Tuasikal, the chief of the Himpunan Keluarga Muslim Maluku (RIK.MA, the Association 
of the Moluccan Muslims) of Jakarta, who argued that 'it was purely a religious conflict, 
which had been planned by Christians.' (Media Dakwah, March 1999: 32) Similarly, 
Ustaz Ali Fauzy, a leading Ambonese figure who became the chief of the Badan Imarat 
Muslim Maluku (BIMM, The State Body of Moluccan Muslims), claimed that the conflict 
was clearly a religious conflict and was a grand scheme of the Christian-cum-the separatist 
group, Republik Maluku Se Iatan (RMS, the Republic of South Moluccas) (Ali Fauzy, an 
interview in Ambon, 27 July 2002). Furthermore, Thamrin Ely, secretary of the task force 
of the Maje/is Ulama Indonesia (MUI, the United of Indonesian Ulama Council) of the 
Moluccas, stated that: 'This was an attack by the Christian separatist group on Butonese, 
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Buginese and Makassarese (BBM) migrants, in an attempt to forcibly segregate Muslims 
and Christians. The 'BBM' in this conflict came to be short for Bakar Bunuh Muslim 
(Bum and Kill Muslims).' (Mimbar Ulama, no. 247, March 1999: 33) Tuasikal, Fauzy 
and Ely represented local Muslims, who believed that it formed part of an intentional 
agenda of Christians and the separatist RMS group. Their claims of a separatist scenario 
were popular among local Muslims. These arguments had little supporting evidence, were 
based on emotional appeals and were politically tendentious. Local Muslims were 
frustrated because of their sense of powerlessness with the rise in number of Muslim 
victims. 
On the other hand, Ambonese Christians responded suggesting that the conflict was not a 
religious conflict, but more a political one. For example, Prof. Nanere, a former rector of 
Pattimura University, argued: 'Muslims and Christians have lived peacefully for a long 
time. Nowadays, however, religion has become a political instrument. There were both 
Jakarta and local Ambonese elites who played a role in the conflict.' (Ummat, no. 35, 15 
March 1999: 28) Nanere's view was similar to that of Latuconsina in that both suggested 
that local Muslims and Christians did not wish to have such a conflict. However, they 
were manipulated by certain groups in Ambon and Jakarta to fight with each other, even 
though this was contrary to their long held tradition of ethnic and religious harmony in the 
Moluccas. 
Among non-Ambonese Christians and Muslims outside the Moluccas, the conflict was 
interpreted as a religious and political conflict in which international elements were 
involved. Former President Soeharto and his cronies were alleged to have intervened with 
the intention of allowing the security forces to manipulate the conflict. However, this 
claim has not been substantiated. H. M. Amin Rais, the chairperson of the National 
Mandate Party (PAN) and the spokesperson for the Maje/is Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR, People Consultative Assembly), reputedly asked the Foreign Minister of the 
United States, Madeline Albright, to put pressure on the U.S. to intervene in the conflict 
(Ummat, no. 35, 15 March 1999). According to Amin Rais: 
Although the intervention of one State in another's affairs is taboo, that possibility 
cannot be eliminated especially when issues of human rights are involved. If the 
security forces, the government and others failed to stop the bloodshed, it would be 
right to seek 'help' from the super power, which is the United States, in order to 
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quickly bring the violence to an end. I think the conflict may spread to other parts 
of Indonesia, if an attempt is made to resolve it by unprofessional methods ... 
Former military members or people who have military skills may be perpetuating 
the conflict (Rais, an interview, Ummat, no. 35, 15 March 1999: 25). 
Because of his views, some politicians and intellectuals criticized Rais for his lack of 
nationalist spirit. Y asril A. Baharuddin, a Commission I member of the Fraksi Karya 
Pembangunan (F-KP, Golkar fraction) in the parliament suggested that Rais had utilized 
the Ambon conflict to conspire with the US to bring about a federal system in Indonesia. 
After Rais' statement, Emha Ainun N ad jib, like General Wiranto, believed that there was 
an international element to the conflict (Smith Alhadar, Ummat, no. 36, 22 March 1999). 
Furthermore, according to Ahmad Syafii Ma'arif, the President of Muhammadiyah,: 
The Ambon conflict had national and international elements. First, it was related to 
a clash of interests amongst the political elite in Jakarta. The intention was to 
damage the central government's credibility. Secondly, there are some indications 
that there were some groups, which intended to change the religious composition 
of Indonesians. This [he claimed without providing any evidence in support] is 
certainly part of a neo-imperialist plot. (Ma'arif, Ummat, no. 35, 15 March 1999: 
28). 
On the other hand, non-Ambonese Christians at the national level responded to the 
conflict by arguing that the conflict was not a religious conflict, but merely a political 
instrnment for local and national elites. It was part of a longer-term decline in the 
symbolic religious harmony between Ambonese Muslims and Christians. Weinata Sairin, 
a vice-secretary of the Indonesian Church Association (PGI), stated that: 
'It was a religious conflict, moreover a crusade ... it was caused by an accumulation of 
frustrations and disappointments, which had been kept in for ten years. They could not be 
expressed, because of the political system and structure at that time.' (Sairin, Ummat, no. 
35, 15 March 1999: 56) Sairin's comments were a critique of the New Order government, 
which had failed to preserve religious harmony under its authoritarian and militaristic 
regime. 
Furthermore, Franz Magnis-Suseno, a Christian intellectual from Jakarta, stated that the 
conflict indicated the formation of a culture of communal violence, reacting to the break-
up of the authoritarian Soeharto regime. Soeharto had pressured the voices of the 'truth' 
for more than thirty years. Now, at last, they could speak the truth as they saw it. 
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Furthermore, Magnis-Suseno suggested that the pressures under the New Order had made 
people more curious as to other communities. They had lost their trust in the government, 
in the judicial system and in rational ways to end what was a regional conflict. Ambonese 
were the victims of the culture of violence (Magnis-Suseno, Basis, March-April 1999: 6). 
Magnis-Suseno stated that the conflict in Ambon was also the product of a long historical 
Muslim and Christian relationship (Basis, March-April 1999: 7). He claimed that the 
conflict had its roots in early clashes between Muslims and Christians from the 11th to 13th 
centuries up until the New Order. In the early period of New Order regime, Soeharto 
intentionally employed Christians, especially Catholics, and created a policy, which was 
seen by Muslims as discriminatory. Magnis-Suseno further stated that Christians had felt 
threatened by Islamisation during the last decade of the New Order (Basis, March-April 
1999:7). 
Magnis-Suseno's historical interpretation was more neutral and realistic, compared to the 
kind ofreporting found in Jakarta-based Muslim magazines, Khutbah Jum 'at and Sabili 
during March-April 1999. Khutbah Jum 'at, a magazine published by the association of 
mosques in Indonesia, claimed that the Ambon conflict was 'a twentieth century Perang 
Sa lib (crusade)'. It reported that Christians had intentionally forced migrants and 
indigenous Ambonese Muslims to move away from Ambon (Khutbah Jum 'at, April 1999: 
63). Similarly, Sabily claimed that the conflict was an international plan by Christians and 
Jews to have Muslims cleansed from Ambon (Sabily, 24 March 1999: 25-26). 
Among the militant Muslim groups on the national stage, the first response was from the 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah Wal Jama 'ah (FKA WJ, The Communication Forum for 
the Followers of the Prophet and His Disciples), which organised an Apel Siaga Umat 
Islam (Muslim Awareness Meeting) in the Sports Stadium at Manahan Solo, 14 February 
1999. The FKA WJ claimed that four thousand Muslims attended this function. During the 
meeting the FKA WJ urged that: 'Muslims must not fall victim to the terrors of Muslims' 
enemies. They have to develop their understanding of this attack, which was intended to 
tyrannise a minority. Muslims were compelled to fight against this attempt to destroy the 
State and national unity.' (Salafy, vol. 30 1999) This was the first official response of the 
FKA WJ to the conflict in Ambon, before mobilizing the Mujahidin (holy warriors) in 
early 2000 (see the following chapter). 
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In March 1999, the national Muslim magazine, Ummat, reported that Christians had 
attacked Muslim villages with the intent of indiscriminately slaughtering Muslims, 
whether indigenous or migrant (Ummat, No. 35, 15 March 1999: 17). A similar message 
was reported in Umar Tuasikal's column, published by Media Dakwah. He was the 
chairperson of the Association of Moluccan Muslims in Jakarta. Tuasikal said that: 'What 
happened during the Jed al Fitr (breaking of the Ramadhan fast) on 19 January 1999 was 
purely a "religious war", which had been planned by Christians over a long period. From 
the Netherlands to Indonesia, Ambonese Christians had been thoroughly preparing.' 
(Media Dakwah, March 1999: 32) Komite Penanggu1angan Krisis (Crisis Solving 
Committee), a Muslim relief Jakarta-based organization affiliated with Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) invitedKyai Abdul Aziz, a great imam (ritual priest) of the Al 
Fattah mosque to talk in Jakarta. The Media Dakwah published Aziz's speech, in which he 
claimed that Christians had been preparing the attack since November 1998 when 
Christians from Hative Besar burned the Muslim village of Waylete. After this Christians 
sent trucks load of machetes to Ambon (Media Dakwah, March 1999: 24; Jaiz, 1999: 86-
87). Aziz claimed that Police and Church leaders had supported the Christians in their 
planned attack on, and burning of Muslims' houses and shops in Ambon. Aziz stated that: 
Before burning the Mardika markets, they [Christians] arranged for three trucks. 
One of the trucks was full of Mobile Brigade (Brimob) people, who were there to 
stop Muslims fighting against them [Christians]. The other two trucks were used to 
gather Muslims' goods and take them to the churches. The churches of Bethlehem, 
Silo and Maranata were full of the barangjarahan (goods of plunder) (Media 
Dakwah, March 1999: 25; Jaiz, 1999: 89). 
Fmihermore, Ahmad Sumargono, the chairperson of the Komite Solidaritas Islam (KISDI, 
Islamic Solidarity Committee), who claimed to have obtained the information from the 
Indonesian intelligence, also alleged that international forces such as the CIA were 
involved. However, the official intelligence reports refuted such allegations. The TNI 
commander and Defence Minister, General Wiranto, also stated that 'there were three 
hands of provocateurs involved in the Ambon conflict: local, national and international 
provocateurs.' (Jaiz, 1999: 158) Sumargono and Wiranto then supported the call for a 
Jihad to Ambon to support Indonesia against an international conspiracy, which it was 
alleged was attempting to destabilise the unity of Indonesia. 
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The request by the local Muslims of Ambon for the support of Muslims at the national 
level stimulated the call for Jihad in Java. In March 1999, about thirty-five thousand 
Muslims from Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi) were organized to join a 
l 5km march from the Al Barkah mosque in T ebet to the Al Azhar mosque in central 
Jakarta. Among them were Ahmad Sumargono, Kyai Abdul Rasyid Abdulah Syafi'i and 
Habib Abu Bakar Al-Habsyi and a team of Ambonese Muslims, who had declared a Jihad 
against Christians (Jaiz, 1999: 182-183). This was the second Muslim gathering in Java in 
response to the Ambon conflict, after the FKA WJ made their declaration on 14 February 
1999. 
On the other hand, Christians saw the conflict as an attempt by Muslims to destroy the 
presence of Christians in Ambon. Christians alleged that the TNI had supported Muslims 
against Christians. The attack by Muslims on the Protestant Church of Silo was cited in 
support of these claims. The Protestant Crisis Center related that on 27 July 1999 Muslims 
from Waihaong to Jalan Barn and Gang Kayu Buah and from the Al Fattah mosque 
attempted to attack Christians in the neighbourhood of the Church at Silo. TNI and police 
officers seemed be there to prevent conflict, but were seen to shoot Christians who then 
were unable to defend the Silo Church against Muslims' attack (Jacky Manuputty, an 
email in Masariku mailinglist, 21 August 1999; Johanes, an interview in Ambon, 2 August 
2002; Abdulgani Fabanyo, an interview in Ambon, 18 August 2002). This analysis was 
confirmed by Muslim Human Rights Watch who suggested that the TNI and Police 
officers helped Muslims in attacking the Christians defending the Silo Church, with the 
purpose of stirring up trouble between the Muslims and Christians (Ike Rulobessy, an 
interview in Ambon, 18 August 2002). 
Among local Ambonese Muslims, Rustam Kastor, retired military Brigadier General of 
armed forces, was one of leading figures who urged that Muslims should be aware of the 
preparations that the Christians-cum-separatists had made to ensure the domination of 
Christians in local politics. 16 In 1999, Kastor began to write a book (published in February 
16 Kastor has published more than four books about the conflict and up until now Kastor continues to write. 
His latest book will be published soon and focuses on Muslim views in the lead-up to the 2003 elections for 
governor. 
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2000). Kastor's first edition became a 'the best seller' and was republished after just three 
months. During the conflict, Kastor was an active advocate for Ambonese Muslims at the 
national level. Kastor urged Muslims to be aware of the hidden purposes of Christians in 
the conflict: 
Let us acknowledge that the organisation behind the conflict has not yet been 
discovered. The mastermind has not yet been revealed, though the slaughter of 
Muslims continues. Therefore, is it true that they [Christians] wish to have 
reconciliation? (Kastor, 2000: 83, translation mine). 
Kastor's provocation attracted Muslims in Java and Sulawesi to join and support the Jihad 
against the Christian-cum-separatists. In the national Muslim media, magazines such as 
the Ummat, the report of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan), the Laskar Jihad's Salafy, the 
DDII's Dewan Dakwah, Sabily, Jum 'at and a daily national newspaper, Republika, all 
extensively reported the pressure Christians were bringing to bear upon minority Muslims 
in the Moluccas during 1999. Ambonese regarded Kastor' s writings as 'the authentic 
historical account of the conflict by an Ambonese Muslim, who had a direct experience 
and deep knowledge of it' (Rifki Hamid, not his real name, an interview in Ambon, 9 
August 2002). 
Hamid was some who held quite different views. He was a Chinese Muslim born in 
Ambon from a middle-class background. He had been involved in religious and social 
activity in the Al Fattah hospital, the Al Fattah mosque, the MUI of Ambon and other 
voluntary organizations. During the conflict, Hamid attempted to support reconciliation 
between Muslims and Christians through his organizations. He represented the views of 
many local Muslims, who held quite different views to Kastor. This reflects the diversity 
of views that existed in Ambon amongst Muslims. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Preman (thug, gangsters, laskar), local and national elites, including elements in the 
Indonesian security forces (TNI), all played key roles in the conflict in the Moluccas. 
However, the continuation of the conflict during this early phase was greatly influenced 
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by disputes among policy-makers in the government and debates amongst Muslims and 
Christians, both at the local and national levels. 
The preman, as provocateurs, played up the rumours, assumptions and commonly-held 
beliefs, thereby mobilising people to attack and kill each other. There was a period of 
temporary peace before the 1999 elections, which raised the expectations of players and 
victims concerning the future of the Moluccas and the possibility of a change in the central 
government regime through the democratic process. After the results of the 1999 elections 
were reported locally and nationally, the Indonesian security forces (TNI and police) were 
alleged to once again having stirred up the conflict, with various security officers 
supporting Christians and Muslims in the battlefield. The escalation of the conflict at this 
stage received coverage in the national media, which attracted Javanese and other non-
Ambonese Muslims and a limited number of Christians to join in the conflict. The Jihad 
declaration turned the conflict from a local to a national issue, which was then utilized by 
certain elites in national politics. 
In the second phase (2000-2002) of the conflict Laskar Jihad forces were mobilised in 
Java and shipped to Ambon. Religious identity became more clearly defined. Yet, what 
factors (political or religious) led to the formation of the Jihad movement and how did 
Ambonese Muslims and Christians respond? 
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Chapter Four 
The Call for Jihad and Christian Solidarity: 
The Second Phase of the Ambon Conflict (2000-2002) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the conflict after the setting up of the Java-based radical 
Muslim paramilitaries of the Laskar Jihad (holy warriors) in response to developments in 
national politics and assertions that Muslim-cleansing was taking place in the Moluccas. It 
will argue that religious segregation after a year of conflict became more pronounced, 
especially after a lot of mixed Muslim and Christian regions in the Moluccas were 
destroyed in the hostilities (see Figure 7: 58). The conflict forced the respective 
communities to separate into areas with their own religious identities. The Laskar Jihad 
will be seen as a type of premanism, which was maintained by a religious creed. It was 
part of a trend towards the establishment of Muslim paramilitary during the weakening of 
New Order structure in the Indonesian transition period (post May 1998). Lindsey's 
concepts of 'state' and 'private' premanism will be utilised in the analysis that follows. 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. It first inquires into the Laskar Jihad's 
background and the reasons it formed. The arrival of the Laskar Jihad and their role in the 
conflict caused Muslims to rise to a position of dominance in the Moluccas. The Laskar 
Jihad left a legacy for local Ambonese in the more radicalised Muslim groups. 
Additionally, this chapter examines the response of Christians to the influx of the Laskar 
Jihad into the Moluccas. Violence in the name of Islam and Christianity became a feature. 
Finally, this chapter will trace the responses of indigenous Ambonese Muslims and 
Christians, national leading figures, government officers and other observers, as the 
conflict escalated during its second phase. 
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4.2 The Background to the Jihad Movement 
In a tabligh akbar (mass religious meeting) of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal 
Jama 'ah (FKA WJ, the Communication Forum of the Sunnah adherents and the Prophet's 
Community) in Solo, Central Java, on 14 February 1999, about a month after the Ambon 
conflict broke out, Ja'far Umar Thalib acknowledged that: 
Muslims must be alert to the threat from Muslims' foes and the separatists, who 
tend to tyrannise the Muslim religious minority. Muslims have an obligation to get 
behind an Islamic government, which is headed by a pious Muslim man. If the 
kafir (infidel) is to lead the government, based on the fatwa (guidance) of Syaikh 
bin Baz [Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz], Muslims will have to battle against him/ her 
(Salafy, no. 30, 1999: 44; translation mine). 
Thalib's account was heavily biased against Christians giving a one-sided elucidation of 
the teachings of Salafy Muslim cleric from Arab peninsula, Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz1 (d. 
13 May 1999), a Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Head of the Council of 
Ulama in Saudi Arabia. For Thalib, Syaikh Abdulaziz was one of the most outstanding 
figures, not only as a Salafy religious teacher, but also as someone with international 
political connections that would help further Thalib's own agenda in Indonesia. The Salafy 
(or Salafi) represent a reformed Islamic ideology in search of Islamic purification by 
returning the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Salafyst (reformist) thinkers base their teaching 
on that of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1896), Abu al-Ala Maududi (1903-1949), and the 
Muslim Brothers' movement thinker, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1964) (Roy, 1995: 34). 
To understand the developments of the Jihad movement in Indonesia, it is important to 
look at Thalib's background and that of the FKA WJ. Thalib was born on 29 December 
1961 in an Arab family at Malang, East Java. Thalib' s father was an advocate of the al-
Irsyad movement, an organization of the sayyid community during the colonial period. 
Graduating from the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA) Jakarta, a higher 
institute sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia, Thalib went to the Maududi 
Islamic Institute in Pakistan, under the sponsorship of the DDII (Dewan Dakwah 
1 Syaikh (or Sheikh) Abdulaziz Bin Baz had been a leading figure in the Saudi Arabian government for 
about fifty years . He came to prominence as a judge of the Al-Kharj region in the 1950s and ultimately rose 
to the highest position among Muslim scholars in Arabia with influence over the Muslim world. He became 
the Grand Mufti , who was responsible for giving religious decrees on certain issues from family problems to 
politics until his death in 1999. See the website set up in appreciation of Bin Baz'sfatawa (religious 
decrees) and his life: htffi://ww"\y.ibobaz.org.sa, accessed on 20 February 2003. 
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Islamiyah Indonesia, Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia), a missionary 
organization established by Muhammad Natsir (d. 1993) in 1967. During his time 
studying in Pakistan, Thalib was involved with the mujahidin of Afghanistan in their 
Jihad against the Soviet Union. Thalib was attached to one of the factions led by an 
Afghan assistant professor of theology who graduated from Mecca. He was associated 
with Abdul Rabb Rassul Sayyafs Saudi-supported organization, the Ittihad-I Islami 
(Islamic Union), Burhanuddin Rabbani's party, the Jami 'at-I Islami (Islamic Association) 
and Gulbudin Hekmatyar's group, the Hizb-I Islami (Islamic Party) before becoming 
devoted to the Jama 'at al-Da 'wa ila al-Qur'an wa Ahl-i Hadith (the Association of 
Propagation toward Qur'an and the Followers of Hadith), a Salafy faction led by Saudi 
cleric, Maulawi Jamilurrahman (d. 1991) (Hasan, 2002: 152; Roy, 1995). From these 
experiences, Thalib deliberated on the disciplines and principles of Jihad in the context of 
politics2 in Indonesia. 
Thalib returned to Jakarta in 1989 and then taught at the al-Irsyadpesantren (Islamic 
boarding school) in Salatiga, Central Java. However, Thalib continued to study Salafy 
doctrines in 1991 under an Yemeni cleric, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'!, one of the spiritual 
teachers of today's conservative Islamist Islah party and the Salafi-Wahhabi movement of 
Yemen (Hasan, 2002: 153). In Yemen, Thalib also studied the Salafy doctrine under some 
Salafi-Wahabi teachers during his hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca): each of them (Muhammad 
Nasr al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), Abdulaziz Abdullah bin Baz (1912-1999) and Rabi' ibn 
Hadi 'Umar al-Madkhali) were prominent figures givingfatwa (guidance) in support of 
the tabligh akbar and later the Jihad avowal in Indonesia and covering an assortment of 
issues from politics to war against Christians (Hasan, 2002: 154). Returning from Yemen, 
Thalib established a pesantren and a Salafy community called the Jama 'ah Ihya al-
Sunnah (the community to establish the Prophet's teachings) in Kaliurang, Y ogyakarta in 
1994. He recruited students from secular universities with a teaching of Manha} Salaji (the 
system of pious ancestors) or Manha} Ahl al-Hadith (the system of the followers of the 
pious ancestors), in a search for authentic Islamic teachings based on canonical books 
2 As a SalafY propagator, Thalib argued that Muslims should not get involved in politics. However, Thalib's 
Jihad and religious rallies were supported by elements in the Islamic political elite and impacted on national 
politics. Therefore, this thesis argues that Thalib's Jihad movement had non-electoral political motives. 
Because, under SalafY teaching and tradition, Thalib pressured his Salafy followers not to join political 
parties. 
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written by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah and the disciple oflbn 
Taymiyyah, Muhammad Abu Bakr ibn Qayyim (Hassan, 2002). Thalib's study in Yemen 
and Saudi Arabia gave him religious legitimacy and a link to financial sources, which 
were the principle means of support for Thalib's Jihad in Indonesia. 
Thalib changed the Ihya al-Sunnah into the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnnah Wal 
Jama''h (FKA WJ) in 1998 and shifted from non-political (da 'wah, Islamic missionary) 
activism to political activism. The FKA WJ was a modem organization with an executive 
board, led by Ayib Safruddin, a graduate of the Psychology Faculty at the University of 
Muhammadiyah, Surakarta, Central Java, and by secretary, Ma'rufBahrun, an engineering 
graduate from Haluoleo University, Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi. Thalib himself was the 
chief of the advisory board (supreme religious board), which had authority over the central 
executive board. The advisory board was comprised of fifty-four Salafi-Wahhabi teachers, 
who had studied at Middle Eastern universities, such as the King Muhammad Ibn Saud 
and Medina Islamic Universities (Hasan, 202: 158). The FKA WJ's members were low-
income, laid-off Muslims and university students. The FKA WJ then established twelve 
pesantrens throughout Indonesia, each with memberships in the region of around forty 
thousand people (Hasan, 2002: 158). These later became the core component of the 
Laskar Jihad. 
It is important to understand the national circumstances during the year between the 
formation of the FKA WJ at the tabligh akbar in Solo and the declaration of the Laskar 
Jihad at another tabligh akbar in January 2000 in Y ogyakarta and the Jihad rally in 
Jakarta three months later in April 2000. During this period, the FKA WJ along with other 
Muslim activists not only had called for a Jihad to Ambon, but also professed that it was 
compulsory for Muslims vote for the only Muslim presidential candidate in the 1999 
elections. They no doubt wanted Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie to continue as president after 
the 1999 elections, rather than Megawati Soekamoputri or Abdurrahman Wahid, for 
whom they claimed it was haram (forbidden) for Muslims to vote. Megawati as a woman 
candidate was unacceptable and Wahid was regarded as a kafir (infidel). Wahid prefered 
to support minority groups, rather than majority modernist Muslims. He did not support 
Islamic political movements, such as the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, 
the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). 
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Thalib argued that: 
Habibie was the only candidate who had Islamic views, in contrast with Wahid 
(PKB) ... and Megawati (PDI-P) who were secular party leaders, who competed to 
assure salibis (Crusaders), Zionists and Chinese conglomerates that they were able 
to devote themselves to the purpose of stopping the dangers of the Islamic 
sectarians (SalafY, no. 33, 1999: 5; translation mine). 
Thalib not only supported Habibie in his presidential candidature withfatwa from 
Wahhabi Ulama from the Arabian Peninsula, but also argued that the Ambon conflict had 
led to a condemnation of the Indonesian military forces and of the government's 
performance (Hasan, 2002: 164). Therefore, Thalib claimed that it was the right time for 
Muslims to fight against Christians in the Moluccas and against Wahid's government. 
On 30 January 2000, the FKA WJ had their second tabligh akbar in Kridosono, 
Y ogyakarta and declared their banner of Jihad for the Moluccas. Thalib stated that: 'The 
tabligh akbar' s Jihad declaration was a response to the arrogance of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid in disregarding the cry of Moluccan Muslims who were hurting as a 
consequence of the horrible crusade.' (Thalib, 2001: 14, translation mine) This was the 
official declaration of the Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jama 'ah (the holy warriors of 
the Sunnah Followers and the Prophet's Community), later called Laskar Jihad. The 
FKA WJ sent a delegation of seven members to the Moluccas on 12 February 2000 to 
prove the involvement of the Moluccan Protestant Church (GPM) and the Catholic Church 
of Ambon in the slaughter of Muslims. 
The Laskar Jihad also invited Indonesian Muslims to join the Jihad to the Moluccas. They 
opened Jihad posts in big cities in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi and sought financial 
support from individual Muslims in mosques, markets, restaurants, streets and, more 
significantly, from high profile national figures and conglomerates, who used to be close 
to Soeharto. 3 During their Jihad operation, the Laskar Jihad claimed to have received 
financial support from ordinary people with individual donations coming from Yemen, 
3 Some speculative analyses conclude that financial support come from elites in the Indonesian military 
forces, under Commander-in-chiefWiranto, for example from Djaja Suparman and Sudrajat; and, from 
some parliamentary members and politicians during and after the Wahid government. However, it is still 
difficult to prove these allegations (Sidney Jones, personal informal talks in Jakarta, end of August 2002 and 
in Canberra, January 2003). 
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Saudi Arabia, Europe, the US and Australia (a FKA WJ staff member, an interview in 
Dogelan, Y ogyakarta, early September 2002); and, from parties in Libya, the Philippines, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Schulze, 2002: 61). However, there was no transparency as to 
the identity of these individuals and organisations, who had donated to the Jihad or as to 
the daily activities of the Laskar Jihad. Besides the sources of the overseas donations were 
difficult to track down after the New York 11th September 2001 attack, when tight 
restrictions 'vvere put in place to prevent support for terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. 
Still support did come in from a few individual overseas sources (a FKA WJ staff member, 
an interview in Dogelan, Y ogyakarta, early September 2002). 
The Laskar Jihad recruited many unemployed Muslims, mostly from Java, South 
Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan, a number of university students, a few university 
graduates from secular universities, some veterans of the Afghanistan war and a very 
small percentage from Islamic universities. Recruitment took place not only in the three 
months, from the January 2000 the declaration of Jihad in Y ogyakarta to the April 2000 
Jihad rally in Jakarta. Many had taken the initiative in joining during February and March 
1999 after the Jihad banner declaration by the FKA WJ and various other Muslim 
organisations. They had a mass rally at the Senayan Stadium on 6 April2000, attended by 
about 50 thousand Muslims, including some high profile figures: Amin Rais, the president 
of the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and an MPR 
Spokesperson; Hamzah Haz, the president of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, 
the United Development Party) later Indonesian Vice-President; Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 
the president of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB); Ahmad Sumargono, the Komite Solidaritas 
Islam (KISDI); other Muslim activists; Moluccan Muslims like Ustaz Ali Fauzy and the 
former commander-in-chief of the Pattimura military command, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Rustam 
Kastor; and some figures from the Middle East (ICG, 2002: 6). Although the Wahid 
government opposed by the rally, the elements in the Indonesian security forces supported 
it. Jakarta police officer, Let. Col Pol. Said Agil, confirmed the involvement of security 
forces and argued that this rally was therefore better compared to other rallies (Republika, 
8 April 2000: 6). Certainly, elements in the Indonesian security forces and in the political 
elite, in particular the poros tengah (central axis), who were disappointed with Wahid's 
government and its policies, supported the rally (X-Pos, no. 21 III, 9-27 January 2000: 5-
6). 
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The Poros Tengah caucus was initiated by Amin Rais of PAN and by other Islamic 
political parties, such as PPP, PBB, Partai Keadilan (PK) and Partai Nahdlatul Urnrnat 
(PNU), the latter which had received only a small number of votes in the 1999 elections. 
They wanted to unite in order to increase their political bargaining power against the 
larger PDI-P, Party of Golongan Karya (PGK) and PKB. The Poros Tengah successfully 
organized support from parliamentary members for Amburrahman Wahid's candidature as 
against Megawati Soekarnoputri for the reason that 'Islam' was against having a woman 
president. They claimed that Wahid was the only candidate able to accommodate the 
frictions among Indonesians. However, Wahid as president did not accommodate the 
various Muslim factions. Wahid even forced representatives from the Islamic parties to 
resign from his cabinet and led a messy government changing those in his cabinet and 
those in strategic positions in the Indonesian Armed Forces many times (Djiwandono, 
2000: 151). 
Therefore, the tabligh akbar in Jakarta represented various vested interests and challenged 
the messy government of Wahid. The Jihad movements with significant political support 
from Jakarta elites caused an increase in the confidence of local Ambonese Muslims, 
while Christians pulled together in the face of worries over the Jihad. They responded by 
seeking national and international intervention in the conflict. 
4.3 The Changing Pattern of the Conflict and the Response of the National Security 
Forces 
In the first phase of the conflict, Christians dominated applying pressure against Muslims. 
As stated in Chapter Three, during this phase, Muslims sought the support of their Muslim 
brothers and sisters in Java, Makassar and Bu ton and succeeded in holding numerous 
Muslim rallies to declare the importance of having a holy war against Christians. On the 
other hand, during the second phase Muslims with the support of the Laskar Jihad gained 
control of the conflict putting pressure on Christian regions and regaining Muslim homes, 
which were abandoned during the first phase. 
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This phase began early in May 2000, after the Laskar Jihad came to Ambon with its first 
group of 3000 members, who were supplied with standard military weapons.4 The 
weapons were sent in a different ship to Ambon and were publicly available for Muslims 
after its anival (Muhamad Yunus, an interview in Ambon, 2 August 2002). In the 
previous month (April 2000) conflict erupted over the issue of the shipping of the Laskar 
Jihad to Ambon. There had been an attempt at reconciliation between the youth of Loupati 
(Christians) and the youth of Ruhumone (Muslims), but four Christians died after a clash 
during the peace rally in Waihong. On 30 April 2000, a bomb blew up and houses were 
burned in Mardika, after a clash between Muslims of Batumerah and Christians of 
Mardika. 
The Laskar Jihad shifted the pattern of the conflict as a result of their access to the 
weapons shipped from Java. Shortly after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, who were 
welcomed by local Muslims as Muslim heroes (Muhammad Yunus, an informal talk in 
Batumerah, Ambon, 6 August 2002), the conflict spread more widely. On 16-17 May 
2000 in the Batumerah-Mardika area, in front of the Pas Kata (city post office) in A.M. 
Sangaji street, 13 people were killed and 50 people were injured. At the same time, from 
16 to 18 May 2000, the conflict also spread to Ahuru and Karang Panjang leaving 17 
people dead. On 20 may 2000, 13 people were killed in conflict in Laha. During these 
conflicts, most of the victims were Christians. Trijono (2001: 61) described this phase of 
the conflict as a kind of 'city war', with both communities using standard military 
weapons. Muslims dominated and now Christians were pressured and fled to the 
mountains and forests. This was the worst period for Christians in the history of the 
Ambon war (Hendrik, not his real name, a Christian priest, an interview in Ambon, 
August 2002). At the end of May 2000, the Maranatha Church sought international 
intervention appealing to the Secretary General of the United Nations to send a 
peacekeeping force to the Moluccas (Trijono, 2001: 63). 
In June 2000, the Laskar Jihad inspired local Muslims to continue the fight against 
Christians. It began on 1 June 2000 in Sekawan Street, Ambon city with shooting between 
4 Before the Jihad paramilitary deployment to Ambon, Ja'far Umar Thalib claimed that about 2000 of the 
Jihad core members got military training in Munjul village, Bogor, West Java under the support of elements 
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the two communities. The conflict continued in Ambon bay, with motorboats used by 
Muslims and Christians to shoot and bomb each other. Muslims had a symbolic victory 
after successfully attacking the Police camp at Tantui on 21 June 2000. Christians 
founded the Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, Moluccan Sovereign Front) on 15 June 
2000 and actively promoted Moluccan sovereignty in the months that followed, in 
response to the pressure coming from Muslims on Christians and the weakness of the 
government and security officers in protecting Moluccans from human rights violations 
(Putuhena, 2001: 82). 
In addition, at the height of the Ambon conflict, President Wahid announced a Civil 
Emergency on 27 June 2000 under Law no. 23/Prp/1959. Because of the civil emergency, 
a military approach was seen as the only way to prevent the escalation of the conflict 
(Trijono, 2001: 64). The Pattimura commander-in-chief was shifted from Max Tamaela to 
I Made Y asa. The security forces then attempted to counter Muslim domination of the 
conflict in Ambon in order to respond to international criticism and pressure. They sent in 
the Yongab (Yon Gabungan, special alliance forces). They were an alliance of the special 
armed forces, Paskhas (the special air forces), special marine forces and special Police 
forces. They took up duties on 22 September 2000, and allowed Christians to attack the 
Muslim region of Iha. In this Christian attack, 55 Iha Muslim families sought refuge. 
From October 2000 to June 2001, the Y ongab attacked Laskar Jihad bases in Ambon. 
Many Muslims were killed under fire from Yongab's military weapons (Syafruddin & 
Prasetyo, 2002). 
The departure of the Yon Gap military forces and police officers, who were used to guard 
the State University of Pattimura from Muslim attack, tragically left one of the most 
important of Moluccan resources unguarded. For three days, 3-5 July 2000, Muslims 
attacked Christians in Poka and Rumah Tiga, and then destroyed the University of 
Pattimura complex, because Muslims claimed it to be a Christian-dominated university 
because of its high percentage of Christian teachers and students (KPMM, 2001: 24). On 
13 July 2000, a military soldier and three people were killed in Ambon bay, Baguala, the 
district (Kecamatan) ofNusaniwe. From 14-16 July 2000, the conflict broke out in 
in the TNI, Afghanistan war graduates and student regiment members (ICG, 2002: 6; Xpos, 17-23 April 
2000, 4; Fealy, 2001). 
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Diponegoro, Pohon Pule, Air Mata Cina, Urimessing, Mangga Dua, Trikora, Anthoni 
Reebok street, Talake, Batu Gantung and Mardika, resulting in mostly Christian 
casualties. On 26 July 2000, a day before the civil emergency law was released, military 
officers captured 200 grenades produced by Pindad, a military weapons producer, and 
found in the state-owned Dobonsolo srup, in Ambon bay, near Gudang Arang (KPMM, 
2001 : 24 ). The ascendancy of military forces after the civil emergency was declared 
reduced the conflict, though it still continued on a smaller scale. However, forced religious 
conversion was used to strike at Indonesian authority at the end of 2000. It began on 23-26 
November 2000, after an attack by Muslims on the Christian community ofKesui Island, 
Eastern Seram, which killed fifty-four people. Some 655 Christians were forced to convert 
and become Muslims (KPMM, 2001 : 28). 
·----·---··--·---· ---------
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Figure 7. Map Showing the Religious Segregation and Conflict 
in the Ambonese Islands in late 2000 (GPM, 2002). 
A tragic incident took place on 11 December 2001 , when eighty Christians died in the 
bombing of the srup, California. This ship provided local sea transportation from Galala to 
Benteng. Ambonese Christians responded to this incident by burning the provincial 
parliament (DPRD) building. In 2002, the conflict began to wane. This was especially 
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after the Malino II agreement on February 2002 (see Chapter Five) and after the formation 
of the national investigation team to follow up the legal and political aspects of the Malino 
II agreement. Neither Muslims nor Christians responded emotionally when there were 
further incidents. For example, on 28 April 2002 the burning of the Soya village left 
twelve Christians dead5; on 27 July 2002 a bombing in the Mardika market left one 
Christian dead and fifty injured6; and, in September 2002 three young athletes died in the 
vicinity of the Mardika Court. In these incidents, both Muslims and Christians realised 
that there were outsider actors involved in trying to prolong the conflict. 
4.4 The Impact of the Laskar Jihad on Local Muslims 
The coming of the Laskar Jihad resulted in the division of local Muslims into two groups: 
local radical groups, which inherited the religious radicalism of the Laskar Jihad and the 
dominant moderate Muslim group, which to some extent was opposed to the mission of 
the Laskar Jihad and tended to cooperate with the government in seeking a peaceful 
solution. They promoted a reconciliation approach. These factions had an impact on the 
dynamics of inter-Muslim relationships and on inter-faith and inter-ethnic reconciliation. 
The first impact of the coming of the Laskar Jihad was a growth in Islamic radicalism 
among local Ambonese Muslims. There were two main radical organisations in Ambon. 
One was the FPIM (Front Pembela Islam Maluku), chaired by Husni Putuhena. He had 
published some books criticising the role of the RMS in the conflict giving an historical 
analysis. The second was the task force of the Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar (AMNM, 
5 The Soya region is a mountainous region, about three hours walking distance from Ambon city. It was 
difficult for ordinary people to be involved in an attack on such a region. The victims, who survived this 
incident came to the conclusion that members of the Special Armed Forces in cooperation with Laskar Jihad 
paramilitary groups were involved in the attack. They listened to the attackers' Javanese accents and 
observed their obvious military skills (Johanes, an interview in Ambon, 2 August 2002). Before the incident, 
the Laskar Jihad seemed to have been coordinating their own attack agenda in consultation with members of 
the Special Armed Forces and other security groups, without involving ordinary Ambonese Muslims 
(Abdulgani Fabanyo, an interview in Ambon, 18 August 2002). 
6 The bomb went off just a few hundred metres away from where I was standing when interviewing 
Christians near the Citra supermarket. Christians screamed 'Acang ... Acang (Muslims .. . Muslims! ... )'. 
Christians were alleging that Muslims had planted this bomb. I saw a group of Special Armed Forces 
personnel save a person (alleged to be Muslim) by using anAcang (Muslim) public car. However, Christians 
then realised that this person was a police intelligence officer, who operated in the Mardika market area 
(Ambon, a fieldwork note, 28 July 2002). 
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Enjoining Right Forbidding Evil) under commander-in-chief, Muhammad At-Tamimy. He 
was of Arab descent and enjoyed public support after Muslims became dominant in the 
middle of 2000. The FPIM gave intellectual support to radical Muslims through their role 
at Muslim rallies and in political movements in agitating against the local government and 
Christians. For example, on 21 April 2002 Laskar Jihad and the FPIM trained around 
1500 young Ambonese Muslims as part of Latihan Pasko Jihad Gabungan (Latposgab, 
the Training for the Alliance of Jihad Posts), in preparation for a planned confrontation 
with Christians on the anniversary of the RMS on 25 April 2002 (Buletin Laskar Jihad 
Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama 'ah, May 2002: 16). On the other hand, the AMNM recruited 
local Muslims as paramilitary members, who then received paramilitary training from the 
Laskar Jihad and teaching in the doctrines of Islam. Local Muslims also claim to have 
had lessons in Islamic ways of war. They indicated that: 'the Laskar Jihad taught us (local 
Muslims) how to use an Islamic ethic in the conflict, in killing, burning and terrorising 
Christians' (Irwan Patty, an interview in Ambon, 10 August 2002). Ustaz Dzulqamain, a 
leading teacher in the FKA WJ, stated that Muslims had a requirement before attacking 
and killing Christians: it was compulsory to teach Christians and persuade them to convert 
to Islam and it was forbidden to kill women and children (Salafy, no. 36, 2001: 19). Such 
teaching concerning war changed the nature of local Muslims' religiosity. They gained a 
confidence and belief that attacking and killing Christians was legalised in Islamic law 
(Irwan Patty, an interview in Ambon, 10 August 2002). 
The moderate groups of Muslims, who had been dominate since the early stages of the 
conflict, opposed to the doctrines of the Laskar Jihad. A counter-movement began with 
the foundation of the BIMM (Badan Imarat Muslim Maluku) in 2001, chaired by Ali 
Fauzy, an Ambonese Muslim leader who had come to the Jakarta rally in April 2000 with 
Rustam Kastor to seek Muslim support in Java. The Laskar Jihad criticised the BIMM, 
describing it as 'a product of government design' in the Moluccas. The BIMM wanted to 
unite Muslim groups in the Moluccas to produce a strong alliance to stop the continuing 
violence and support reconciliation with Christians. Furthermore, the original religious 
practices of Ambonese Muslims, who were traditional Sunni adherents, were different 
from the Salafy tradition of the Laskar Jihad (Ali Fauzy, an interview in Ambon, 27 July 
2002). 
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It seems that local Ambonese Muslims had supported the Laskar Jihad just to secure their 
lives against the perceived threat of the Christians and the separatist RMS. However, after 
the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Laskar Jihad returned to Java. Local Ambonese 
Muslims found release from their fears and burdens by working towards a reconciliation 
with their Christian counterparts. 
4.5 The Response of Christians 
The response of the Christian community gathered pace from early 2000 onwards and 
especially after the Jihad's arrival in the Moluccas. Early on Muslims perceived the Jihad 
to be against Christians who had attacked Muslims. In addition, a few months after the 
Jihad's arrival, the Jihad's focus changed from one against Christians to one against the 
separatist RMS movement. Muslims assumed that the RMS had support in the wider FKM 
community. (FKM had raised the RMS's flag during their April anniversary in 2001.) 
However, in fact, most Christians refused to support FKM's political motives in planning 
to separate from the republic. They claimed that Alex Manuputty and the FKM were one 
of the military factions involved in inflaming issues in the Christian and Muslim 
communities. The issue of separatism was illogical according to Christians. When the 
FKM was first founded, it did have significant support from Christians, who saw it as a 
moral movement criticising the ruling government, which had failed to solve the conflict. 
Christians later warned the central government that they would seek international 
intervention to solve the ongoing conflict. This was after the pressure by Muslims on the 
Christian community, especially with the presence of Jihad warriors in the battlefield. In 
August 2000, Alex Manuputty along with Tamrin Tomagola, the Muslim representative in 
the group, 7 campaigned against human rights violations in the Moluccas appealing to the 
public in the United States. 
During this time, some Christians supported the FKM and Manuputty' s human rights 
campaign. However, after returning from the US, Manuputti's approach became more 
political, opposing the ruling government by arguing that the Moluccas ought to be 
7 Radical Moluccan Muslims criticized Tomagola's record as a representative during the campaign. They 
claimed that Tomagola did not know about what happened in the Moluccas (Irwan Patty, an interview in 
Ambon, 10 August 2002). 
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separated from Indonesia, as it was a Moluccan right that had been trampled on with the 
illegal taking-over of its territories by Soekamo's government in the 1950s (Johanes, a 
Christian and human right activist, an interview in Ambon, July and August 2002). 
Manuputty's ideas represented the point of view of other FKM's suppo1ters, who were 
criticising the central government for exploiting the Moluccas and intentionally ensuring 
that the conflict continued. A majority of indigenous Moluccan Christians and Muslims 
supported this critique. 8 However, they had no power to refuse the centralisation of 
conflict resolution policy and the power of armed forces in the Moluccas, which came 
about in the region due to the actual demands of the populace. 
With the failure of the ruling government in banning Jihad warrior activities in the 
Moluccas and the rise in number of Christian victims during 2000, solidarity among 
Christians grew. As a consequence, Christian fundamentalism increased and made the 
conflict more severe in 2000 than in 1999. There were some groups that had an important 
role in the growth of this fundamentalism, in particular, the Coker and other field leaders, 
who had played key roles, in defending the Christians against Muslims in 2000. Agus 
Watimena, the leader of the Coker ( Cowok-Cowok Kristen, Christian Boys ),9 a gang based 
in Kudamati claimed that: 'this is a real religious war and we have to protect ourselves. 
Sometimes protection means attacking first. We have a plan, and when the time comes, we 
will wipe them out' (ICG, 2000: 15). Watimena's call for Christian solidarity was in 
response to the pressure exerted by the Jihad warriors on the Christian community. It 
served to make the conflict situation more tense. 
The Laskar Kristus paramilitary group was formed during the early stages of the conflict, 
but this movement gained significant momentum after the destruction of the Silo church, 
the oldest church in Ambon, on December 1999. The paramilitaries were led by Agus 
Wattimena and by Emang Nikijuluw, Semmy Souissa and Melkianus YusufTuhumury 
after Wattimena's death on 22 March 2001. The Christian groups consisted of 25 small 
divisions of 100-200 militant members in the city of Ambon and neighbouring islands, 
8 This is based on my interviews with Muslims and Christians on the issues of centralisation and local 
autonomy in the Moluccas from July to August 2002. 
9 The Coker was originally a gangster group called Cowok-Cowok Keren (Handsome Boys), but after the 
conflict they renamed it Cowok-Cowok Kristen. The change in name was important and was intended to 
62 
where some 60 per cent of members were estimated to be between 12 and 25 years old 
with a few women members also (Schulze, 2002: 63). They used traditional arms such as 
knives, machetes, poisoned arrows, homemade guns and small numbers of automatic 
weapons obtained from 'organic' (local tour of duty) police and former East Timor 
militias in Kupang, West Timor (Schulze, 2002: 63-64). 
4.6 Analyses of the Second Phase of the Ambon Conflict 
Discussions of the conflict during this phase covered a variety of topics: the meaning and 
relevance of the Jihad and its political motives, the involvement of the TNI in local 
Christian and Muslim paramilitaries and the failure of the state and government to protect 
citizens by letting the mass killings in the Moluccas go on. 
In early 2000, debates in Java over the Jihad were crucial to how Indonesians responded 
to the departure of the Laskar Jihad for Ambon. On the other hand, Ambonese Christians 
responded to the arrival of the Laskar Jihad with a rise in Christian solidarity and the 
formation of Christian paramilitary. The formation of the FKM was also part of a 
Christian response to the increasing Muslim presence and the support given it by radical 
Muslims in Java; and was also in response to the failure of the State security apparatus to 
protect Moluccans. However, Ambonese Muslims interpreted the FKM' s formation and 
its views on Moluccan sovereignty as the emergence of a RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) 
movement with separatist groups seen as a threat to their interests. They in tum were 
supported by the central government and especially by the Indonesian military forces. The 
Laskar Jihad shifted their focus from a war against Christians to a war against separatist 
groups, which seemed more nationalistic than being an anti-Christian movement. The 
Laskar Jihad also used this pretext to send their paramilitary members to Poso, Papua and 
East Kalimantan. Therefore, the analysis of this second phase will be divided into several 
parts. First, it will examine the debates concerning Jihad among Muslims and the critique 
of it by Christians. Secondly, it discusses the roles of the Laskar Jihad, the security forces 
and national political elites. It argues that the State's failure to protect its citizens was the 
foster Christian solidarity against Muslims during the conflict (a discussion with Christian youths in Ambon, 
July 2002). 
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result of the weakness of the government and of frictions between national elites over the 
way to solve the conflict. 
After the mass rally of Laskar Jihad's paramilitary members in Senayan, Jakarta, on 6 
April 2000, their training in Bogor from 7-17 April 2000 and the departure of their Jihad 
to Ambon at the end of April, there were debates over the concept of Jihad and its 
interpretation in the Indonesian context. Ustadz (religious teacher) Rodji Jaelani, a 
chairperson of Pagar Nusa, a traditional martial arts organization under the Nahdlatul 
Ulama of Jakarta, criticised the Jihad of the Laskar Jihad describing it as a 
misinterpretation of the meaning of Jihad. Jaelani stated that it was more a political 
movement than religious one, claiming that it was intended to oppose the leadership of 
President Wahid (Jaelani, Xpos, no. 13/III, 17-23 April 2000: 5). Jaelani's critique of the 
Jihad's political motives was in line with Roy's argument, which suggested that the 
radical fundamentalists' motives for their movements had worldly rather than religious 
motives (Roy, 1994). Similarly, Hasyim Muzadi, a chairperson of the Nahdlatul Ulama, 
the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, argued that such a Jihad was contrary to the 
Prophet's Jihad, who would not have agitated for conflict, but would have sought to 
mediate between both communities. Dr. Ma'arif Jamu'in supported Muzadi's argument, 
that Jihad movement should attempt to bring peace and a humanitarian awareness, but not 
to declare war against Christians (Kompas, 10 April 2000, 
http://www. kompas. com/kompas-cetak/00411 O/nasional/nuti06. htm, accessed on 8 
February 2003). 
Concerning the Laskar Jihad's political motives, Alhadar (Republika, 11 April 2000), a 
Moluccan Muslim intellectual living in Jakarta, stated that the deployment of the Jihad 
paramilitaries to Ambon was a response of Javanese Muslims, who were disappointed 
with the government's failure to protect the local Muslims. This was also the reason 
Muslim politicians gave their support to the Jihad, though with an expectation of gaining 
political advantage. The Jihad simply provided a religious basis to legalize and legitimate 
the political motives of the Jihad movements. 
Furthermore, Alhadar criticized the statement of President Wahid suggesting that 
Christians had attacked Moluccan Muslims because of their anger over the domination of 
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Muslims in strategic government positions during Aqib Latuconsina's period as governor 
and, to lesser extent, during Saleh Latuconsina's governorship (Republika, 11 April 2000). 
However, Alhadar misinterpreted what had happened in the Moluccas through a lack of 
in-depth understanding of the actual situation on the ground. Alhadar stated that: 
Indonesia will fracture if the majority community discriminated against others. In 
regard to Moluccan Christians, the international community will pressure 
Indonesians, if Christians were seen as the victims. It will cause the West to 
support the separatists, such as happened in Sudan. So, separatist groups will 
develop in Indonesia (Alhadar, Republika, 11 April 2000: 6, translation mine). 
The opinion of Alhadar was contrary to the actual situation in the Moluccas. The separatist 
group represented only a small number of people in the Moluccas, and their role in the 
current conflict had been exaggerated. Ambonese Christians insisted that observers 
understand that they had been dedicated to integration with Indonesia ever since the 
revolutionary period. The issue of separatism, on the contrary, had been utilised by radical 
Muslims to attack Christians using a nationalist pretext. 
By contrast, Tomagola (2001a), a Galela of North Moluccan origin, refuted the claim that 
political motives were the only reasons for the growth in religious paramilitaries. He 
suggested that it was a consequence of cultural changes in Ambonese and Indonesian 
society, which had led to premanism under the hand of informal leaders in the post-New 
Order period. Tomagola argued that the growth in religious paramilitaries was due to the 
changing roles of the formal and informal leadership in Ambon. After the New Order the 
role of state officials was weakened. They became kapitan (war commanders) 10 and 
preman, who sought to continue the conflict until the death or departure of each and every 
one of their enemies. The popularity of the Laskar Jihad during 2000 was the result of 
this change in the informal leadership. The rise of paramilitaries was also a natural 
consequence of the changing role of the security forces, which had been frustrated by the 
change in regime from Soeharto's New Order to Reformasi. Furthermore, Tomagola 
(2001) suggested that what had motivated the military forces before the civil emergency or 
military emergency laws were enacted was a cynical view in the forces concerning human 
rights that was prevalent in the military. Their supposed concern with regard to human 
10 In traditional adat, during times of conflict, there were kapitan who led local forces and coordinated with 
local chiefs in the battlefield. 
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rights violations was contrary to the reality that seventy per cent of the mass killings had 
been caused by standard military weapons (Tomagola, 2001: 102). 
Tomagola's critique of the involvement of the security forces was similar to that of 
Aditjondro (2001 ), who stated that the deployment of Jihad to the Moluccas was an 
attempt to prevent the Moluccas becoming another East Timor, which had gained its 
independence and separated from Indonesia (2001: 120). However, this analysis was too 
speculative, because most Muslim and Christian Ambonese preferred to be part of 
Indonesia. Furthermore, Aditjondro (2001), in analysing the involvement of the 
Indonesian military forces in the conflict and their support for the Jihad groups and 
Christian militias, suggested that they sought to: 
... counter students' opposition to the military's dual function by turning a vertical 
conflict into a horizontal conflict; ... to defend the archipelago concept or 
wawasan nusantara; ... to defend the territorial structure of the Armed 
Forces; ... and to defend high-ranking officers from humiliation in criminal, human 
rights and corruption trials (Aditjondro, 2001: 119). 
Aditjondro, however, did not consider that there was 'a competition' among military 
officers to find support, not only from politicians, but also from mainstream groups. 
Aditjondro's speculations had even less evidence. The official involvement of the armed 
forces in the conflict was too risky in the context of their wanting to secure their political 
future in the transition Indonesian state, as Amien Rais has argued, but individual and 
factional involvement was possible (Gani, 2002). For example, the support of Wiranto 
factions for the Muslim militia was clearly based on the need to find sympathy amongst 
Muslim politicians in opposing the ruling Wahid administration. Of course, Wiranto got 
into trouble in continuing to emphasise ethno-religious identity issues in dealing with the 
politics of the transition period. Sulistyo (2001) suggested that the military should reform 
its views concerning democracy and its professional attitudes to bring them in line with 
popular opinion and to enable them to become part of the new Indonesian reform 
government. 
Local and national responses driving the second phase of the conflict allow us to see the 
complexity of conflict, with implications for local and national identity and for the future 
of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relationships in Indonesia in general. The resurgence in 
local identity after the introduction of the regional autonomy policy mus be considered by 
66 
the central government as it formulates policy to enhance local access to economic and 
natural resources under transparent and fair laws and regulations. Therefore, it is argued, 
future religious (such Jihad movement) and ethnic agitation (including by security forces) 
in Ambon can be avoided with the existence of strong regulation and the application of the 
local culture of harmony and tolerance. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
The second phase of the conflict shifted the pattern from one of Christian dominance to 
one of Muslim ascendancy with significant support coming from the Laskar Jihad 
paramilitary in Java. The Jihad declared in Jakarta had political nuances, which suggest 
that it was organised by the central axis (paras tengah) to oppose the ruling Wahid 
government. The coming of the Laskar Jihad to Ambon brought Islamic radicalism to the 
local Ambonese Muslims through the FPIM and the Task force of the AMNM. However, 
mainstream Ambonese Muslims later in 2001 began to oppose the control of the Laskar 
Jihad. On the other hand, Ambonese Christians responded to the Jihad with a rise in 
Christian solidarity; the mobilisation of Christian paramilitary in the name of Christ 
(Laskar Kristus, Christ's Soldiers), and, with the attempt to push for FKM-style local 
sovereignty. In this period, the Indonesian military forces initially supported the Muslim 
factions, but after international pressure and a rise in the number of Christian victims, they 
shifted to pressuring radical Muslim groups. This was an instance of a State failure to 
protect Ambonese Muslims and Christians from a security force serving its own interests. 
It was also the result of an ambiguity in the stance of local and central governments 
toward dealing with the problem, that was evident from the early period onwards. As 
Tomagola (2001), Aditjondro (2001) and Alhadar (2000) have suggested, this phase of 
the conflict was proof of the failure of the State and highlights the importance of 
rebuilding a neutral and strong government and security situation in support of attempts 
towards reconciliation. 
The ongoing conflict in Ambon raised questions as to why the attempts made toward 
reconciliation between Muslims and Christians did not succeed. It appears that attempts at 
reconciliation had been made even from the early stages of the conflict in 1999 and were 
continued by various government and non-government organizations. However, the 
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proposed pacts failed to accommodate both communities and, consequently, the conflict 
went on. I argue that the reconciliation approaches attempted were evolutionary steps for 
Muslims and Christians taken as part of a longer-term program of moving toward 
reconciliation. Such moves gained momentum as the conflict seemed to drag on. 
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Chapter Five 
Reconciling Muslims and Christians 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will trace attempts to forge a reconciliation between Ambonese Muslims and 
Christians unde11aken since the early period of the conflict. It will analyse the models for 
reconciliation and the problems faced. It will propose alternative methods for 
reconciliation, based on the views of both communities. Furthermore, it will consider how 
the relationship between the government and civil society is vital to the process of 
reconciliation. It will criticise the highly centralised government policy and structure, 
which still in place in this Indonesian transition period. This chapter will argue that as 
Ambon city is a modem and industrial city with a well-educated Muslim and Christian 
population, it needs a modem mechanism for reconciliation. A reassessment of the Pela 
Gandong tradition, as attempted by some local NGOs, is needed in order to accommodate 
the demands 0f a modem community as well as the spirit of local tradition. This may be a 
way of bridging the gaps between the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ambonese 
communities and helping to bring them into a modernity based on familiar local traditions. 
5.2 The Attempts to Bring about Reconciliation during the Conflict 
There have been attempts at reconciliation since the early stages of the conflict in Ambon. 
They have some common features: both local and central governments have made on-
going attempts to initiate reconciliation with the involvement of both civil and military 
officers; there has been the grassroots-level involvement of local, national and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs); there has also been attempts by 
Ambonese themselves to resolve the situation in their local communities. These features 
can be divided into two patterns: top-down and bottom-up initiatives - each with their 
strengths and weaknesses. This chapter will argue that in the case of reconciliation in 
Ambon, neither the government nor the NGO approach on their own would have been 
successful. Both are needed, for reasons that will be explained. In both the Ambonese and, 
more general, Indonesian cultures a patrimonial, top-down approach to leadership and 
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problem-solving is the norm. On the other hand, grassroots-level organizations have a 
great potential in helping Ambonese to strengthen their communities and in helping them 
to resolve the issues in a locally-relevant way according to their own local customs and 
traditions. Issues of competition over access to resources between government and NGOs, 
between local and central governments and between the elites, including the military, in 
various areas will need to be resolved in the longer term. 
The first local government initiative toward reconciliation involved the formation of the 
'Team Six' (Tim Enam). It was formed at the end of January 1999 and was given the task 
of investigating the January 1999 conflict and seeking ways to resolve the issues arising 
from it. It comprised both Muslim and Christian representatives: Thamrin Elly, Luthfy 
Sanaky, John Ruhulesin, M.G. Lailosa, Bruno Rumyaru, and Condratus Ufie (Trijono, 
2001: 136). With the escalation of conflict, it was found necessary to expand this group to 
make it more representative and include local bureaucrats, religious leaders, military 
leaders, adat chiefs and others in the local elite. This new team was given the name Pusat 
Rujuk Social (PRS, the Social Reconciliation Centre). In its early stages, the team was able 
to successfully look after mosques, churches and other places where there was potential 
for violence. It set about analysing the roots of the conflict, formulating a reconciliation 
process, creating suburban security patrol posts, consolidating management of negeri-
negeri (village areas), running seminars and workshops discussing the roots of conflict, 
and working towards creating peace (Trijono, 2001: 137). 
The PRS initiated a reconciliation treaty at the Merdeka Square, Ambon on 12 May 1999. 
It was signed by religious leaders, heads of the adat community, youth leaders and other 
grassroots Muslims and Christians 1• There were seven points in the deal: 
It was unanimously agreed to be committed a new human relationship in a 
peaceful atmosphere, which constrained us wholeheartedly to stop every kind of 
conflict and violence; and to destroy any suspicions, resentment, hate and hostility, 
by continuously attempting to set aside the things of the past and engage in calm 
dialogue. [Furthermore, we] appreciate of diversity (kebinekaan) ofreligions, 
1 The pact was signed by R.R. Hasanusi (MUI chief), Pdt. S.P. Titaley (the chief of Sinode GPM, Protestant 
Church), Mgr. Joseph Tethol (Uskup Dioses Amboina, Catholic Church), Hussein Tuasikal (Remaja Masjid, 
chief of Mosque Youth), Ferry Nahusona (Angkatan Muda GPM, GPM Youth), FR Simon P Matruty 
(Catholic Youth), RE Latuconsina (Latupati (head) of district (kecamatan) of Saparua islands), AL Loilosa 
(Latupati of district Amahai), Corputy (Latupati of district Kairatu), Pellu (the king ofHitu Lama), Abdul 
Aziz Abide (Association of South Sulawesi Families), La Hamsidi (Association of Southeast Sulawesi 
Family) and Ngurah Nyoman Wiandnyana (Bali Community) (MUI, 2000: 173, Appendix 1). 
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ethnicities, traditions, adat (cultures) and will continue to build relationships and 
national harmony, which is the essence of the national vision (wawasan 
kebangsaan) (MUI, 2000: 173, translation mine). 
This treaty was nonetheless a top-down agreement, which was not understood by the 
grassroots, who were largely concerned for their safety and that of their communities. The 
team ceased to exist after the second period of the conflict began in July 1999. It was seen 
by the grassroots as a government body, which was unable to probe the roots of the 
conflict because of its top-down approach. The Muslim and Christian communities felt 
they could not rely on this part. 
The next government initiative was the 'Team Twenty-four', which was initially formed to 
ensure the protection of President Wahid and his Cabinet during their visit to Ambon in 
December 1999. It began by distributing some thirty thousand pamphlets to communities 
in both Muslim and Christian regions, dropping them by army helicopter on 7 December 
1999. These pamphlets were signed by Abdullah Tuasikal, Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam 
Maluku (the Coordination Body of the Moluccan Muslims), J.J. Polanaya, Gerakan Peduli 
Kemanusiaan Maluku (the Humanity Awareness Movement of the Moluccas) and Agus 
Ulahaiyanan, Crisis Centre Keuskupan Amboina (the Crisis Centre of the Ambon 
Diocese). They outlined the Deklarasi Menahan Diri (Restrain Oneself Declaration), 
which stated: 
Towards the coming holy month ofRamadhan and Idul Fitri 1 Syawal 1420 H., 
Christmas (25 December 1999) and New Year 2000, people are expected to refrain 
from activities, which might instigate violence. Therefore, people are not to hold 
mass gatherings, nor to fabricate irresponsible rumours .. . nor to shoot, bomb or 
other similar activities, which would stir up mass feelings ... and to immediately 
form security patrol posts (Indo. Pos Keamanan Masyarakat) in each 
neighbourhood [to calm the local population, give them a sense of security and a 
sense of their participation in ensuring their security] (Crisis Centre Keuskupan 
Amboina, 2002: 9; translation mine). 
Of course, the statement was intended to calm the sentiments and emotions of both 
communities, before the arrival of President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati on 12 
December 1999. They were coming to meet the local government staff, the leaders of the 
TNI and Polri, the adat chiefs and religious leaders. Wahid said that only the Moluccans 
themselves could solve the Moluccan tragedy and the government would only be a 
facilitator (Crisis Centre Keuskupan Amboina, 2002: 9). The peace prevailed until 19 
71 
December 1999 when conflict again broke out in Kampung Java, Ambon. Four people 
were killed and eight were seriously injured (Crisis Centre Keuskupan Amboina, 2002: 9). 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both at a local and national level, also played a 
pivotal role in reconciliation attempts. The growth in number ofNGOs was enormous 
from under fifty before the conflict to more than four hundred during the conflict 
(Jefferson Tasik, an interview in Ambon, August 2002). This growth can be seen as a 
consequence of a growth in civil society activity in Ambon during the conflict. The NGOs 
saw reconciliation as a long-term process. Two examples of successful NGO outcomes 
were the Wayame regional self-protection units and the TIRUS (Tim Relawan Untuk 
Kemanusiaan, The Voluntary Teams for Humanity) initiated by 12 NGOs. However, the 
NGOs were not able to make contact with the radical Muslim and Christian groups, which 
were involved in mobilising the communities for battle. 
The religious and social leaders of the village of Wayame took the initiative in forming the 
'Team Twenty of Wayame'. It was founded in February 1999 to protect the region of 
Wayame from attack and from influences coming from conflict in other regions. The team 
successfully protected their community (Muslims and Christians) from outside influence. 
Both the Muslim and Christian communities were assisted by the Wayame team in 
conducting intensive dialogue, prayers for peace and encouraging respect for each other. 
From this experience, we can conclude that the Ambon conflict was not purely a religious 
conflict, but was instigated by outsiders. Tony Pariela, one of Wayame's leading figures , 
argued that the region of Wayame had been stirred up over a lot of issues and there were 
isolated attacks on people and property by outsiders, but because of the strong awareness 
of Wayame inhabitants, conflict between the two communities did not take place (Tony 
Pariela, an interview in Ambon, 31 July 2002). However, the team continued to function 
only until May 2000 when outsiders mounted a full attack on Wayame. Thus began the 
last and third stage of the conflict (Trijono 2001: 144). 
In addition, TIRUS was founded by Yayasan Baileo (Baileo Foundation) in conjunction 
with 12 NGOs on 2 February 1999 (Trijono, 2001: 150). It attempted to coordinate local 
NGOs with the support of national and international funding organisations. It aimed to 
strengthen local organisations and communities in moving towards reconciliation, in 
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rebuilding social ties and helping to support the victims of the conflict. These initiatives 
were effective in working with the grassroots and to a certain extent were effective in 
dealing with the radical groups and gangs in both regions. The Baileo Foundation founded 
volunteer networks in both Muslim and Christian communities. It attempted to help 
people recover psychologically from what had happened, providing counselling for 
women, children and disabled victims of the conflict in both Muslim and Christian regions 
in Ambon, Central Moluccas and Southeast Moluccas. 
After the failure oflocal government to bring about reconciliation in 1999, local 
government officials again tried to facilitate the process of working towards ending the 
conflict. This team was called Tim Fasilitator Pemda (The Regional Government 
Facilitator team). On 14 January 2000, Governor Saleh Latuconsina released a statement 
announcing the formation of reconciliation teams among villages all over the Ambonese 
islands. These teams had the job of implementing a program of reconciliation, which was 
to function at the village level (Trijono, 2001: 138-139). These local government 
approaches, however, were ineffective because of a leadership dispute between the civil 
government and the security and police forces as to who was really in charge during the 
civil emergency after June 2000. According to the law, the highest policy maker in the 
local government was the Governor, but, in fact, the security forces had their own agenda, 
which was sometimes contrary to that of the Governor. 
In addition, the central government created a special policy covering conflict areas in the 
Moluccas, Papua and Aceh. With respect to the Moluccas, President Wahid gave to Vice-
President Megawati the task of coordinating the efforts of Coordinating Ministers from the 
Ministry of Politics and Security, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Ministry for Social 
Welfare and Poverty Eradication in initiating a long-term program for reconciliation as 
from January 2000 (Trijono, 2001: 154-155). One of these reconciliation programs was 
coordinated by the Department of Religious Affairs and a social reconciliation meeting 
among Moluccans in Jakarta was scheduled in January 2000 (Trijono, 201: 155). 
However, this central government initiative, though ambitious, ran into problems because 
of the difficulty in getting executive members to work with each other. This was the result 
of frictions between the Vice-President and President and between other leading figures in 
the central government and because of Megawati appeared reluctant to resolve them. 
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After the change in the regime, from Wahid to Megawati, the central government 
continued to pursue steps toward reconciliation. Under President Megawati' s leadership, 
the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, played a mediating role at a 
meeting between opposing Christian and Muslim factions in Malino, South Sulawesi, on 
11 -12 February 2002. They reached an agreement called the Moluccas agreement of 
Malino II (Tomagola, 2002). At this meeting, thirty-five Muslim and thirty-five Christian 
government officers, political leaders, heads of villages, and Muslim and Christian 
community leaders agreed to sign an 11 -point joint declaration. Amongst its points were: 
(1) To end all conflict and violence, (2) to abide by due process of law which is to 
be enforced fairly . . . (3) to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, 
including aspirations for a Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) ... ( 4) the people of 
the Moluccas have the right to stay and work legally in the Republic of Indonesia 
nationwide and in the Moluccas, by respecting the local culture and law and order, 
(5) to ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups, or militias, in 
accordance with the existing law. Outsider parties that disturb the peace in the 
Moluccas will be expelled from the Moluccas, ( 6) to establish a national 
independent investigation team to investigate, for example, the tragic incident on 
19 January 1999, and the alleged involvement of the Moluccas Sovereign Front 
(Front Kedaulatan Maluku-FKM), Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku 
Selatan-RMS), Christian Republic of South Moluccas (Kristen Republik Maluku 
Selatan-Kristen RMS), Jihad warriors (Laskar Jihad) and Christ Warriors (Laskar 
Kristus) . .. (Tomagola, 2002: 6). 
Radical Muslim groups argued that the Malino II declaration was one-sided, not involving 
them in the process of reconciliation. They argued that Muslims at the meeting were not 
representative of Moluccan Muslims and that there were some Christians in the meeting, 
who they claimed had been involved in the RMS separatism and in planning the mass 
killing of Moluccan Muslims from the early stages of the conflict (Muhammad At-
Tamimy, an interview in Ambon, August 2002). Pariela, the head of Christian delegation 
at Malino II, stated that they had invited the radical Muslim groups, even though these 
groups were reluctant to cease fighting. The radical Muslim groups said that they would 
only join the meeting if all kapitan (leaders) of the Muslim security patrol posts (about a 
hundred people) were involved in the meeting and if they were able to screen members of 
the Christian delegation to exclude RMS activists. Pariela retorted that this was an 
irrational approach to take as part of a process of working towards reconciliation (Tony 
Pariela, an interview in Ambon, 31 July 2002). 
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The Malino II agreement became the key to further reconciliation steps in Ambon 
covering the broader issues, not only in dialogue, but also in searching for political and 
economic solutions acceptable to both communities. However, the process was in the 
hands of government, without the participation of ordinary people. Therefore, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) came to have a prominent role as a bridge between 
government and society. The NGOs reached a broad cross-section of people from ordinary 
people to those who had led in the battlefield. In the Muslim regions, the Moluccan branch 
of the Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nahdlatul 
Ulama, the NU Institute for Human Resources Development), an NGO under the biggest 
Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, played a significant role in accommodating the 
views of grassroots Muslims in reaching a peacefulsolution. The Lakpesdam NU made 
available psychological treatment for young local Muslims, who had been directly 
involved in the war against Christians, and facilitated dialogue between them and their 
Christian counterparts. However, the large number ofNGOs in Muslim and Christian 
regions, (more than four hundred in 2001, four times larger than in 1998), could lead to 
two possible outcomes: a growth in civil society, or fear and rivalry among factions in 
both communities. 
5.3 Muslim and Christian Views of the Reconciliation Process 
Local and national Muslims and Christians and Western observers gave various accounts 
of the conflict and made various suggestions as to how to proceed in the future. The first 
reconciliation proposal by local government and non-governmental organisations was for 
the re-implementation of the indigenous Ambonese culture of Pela Gandong (see Chapter 
Two). There were disputes over the existence and effectiveness of indigenous culture as a 
means of reconciliation for modem Ambonese. The Team Komunikasi dan Informasi 
Ummat (The Communication and Information Team of Muslims) of Ambon (1999) stated 
that the culture of Pela Gandong had been broken down since the conflict had broken out. 
The Muslim team questioned the viability of this culture in the period leading up to the 
conflict asserting that there had been a Christianisation of, and Christian dominance in, the 
economy, in education and in government staff and teaching positions, where corruption, 
collusion, nepotism were alleged to be rife (1999: 9). Similarly, Putuhena and Tawainella, 
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from the Defender Front for Islam of the Moluccas (FPIM), claimed that the Pela 
Gandong tradition was merely a Christian instrument to 'trivialise Islamic theology' 
(2001: 13). Furthermore, At-Tamimy, the commander-in-chief of the local radical 
Muslims of the Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar task force, argued that the indigenous culture 
of Pela Gandong was contrary to the principles of Islamic law, in its very nature for it was 
originally designed by the colonial government to discriminate against Ambonese 
Muslims (Muhammad At-Tamimy, an interview in Ambon, 4 August 2002). 
However, these arguments of the Team Komunikasi dan Jnformasi Ummat and Putuhena, 
Tawainella and At-Tamimy were contrary to historical fact. The Pela Gandong tradition 
was founded before the colonial period. It applied among Muslims from different clans 
and ethnic groups during the alliance of the Hitu and Temate kingdoms (Bartels, 1973). 
Such views concerning the Pela Gandong tradition had a political motive, which was to 
avoid the reconciliation process sponsored by mainstream Muslim and Christian groups, 
who had initiated this process based on the re-implementation of the Pela Gandong 
culture in support of the government's programs for peace. Certainly they gained greater 
political popularity after arguing and campaigning for these ideas amongst local Muslims, 
especially non-indigenous Ambonese Muslims. The views of the Muslim Team and the 
FPIM concerning the Pela Gandong tradition were popular among Muslims born in 
Ambon of Arab, Buginese, Makassarese, Butonese and Javanese descent and among non-
Ambonese migrants, who did not have a sense of identification with this Pela Gandong 
tradition, which tied indigenous communities from different families, clans, ethnic groups 
and religions. 
On the other hand, the Muslim King of Batumerah refuted Muslims' views that the adat of 
Pela Gandong was contrary to Islamic culture. He claimed it was an application of 
Qur' anic verses recommending friendship and relationship with Christians and other non-
Muslims (King of Batu Merah, a personal interview in Ambon, August 2002). Likewise, 
Marasabessy, an indigenous Ambonese and the head of Religious Affairs in Ambon, 
argued that the implementation of Pela Gandong culture is not contrary to Islam, but 
represents an assimilation of Islamic values with local culture. However, for modem 
Ambonese, state laws or government regulations are needed enable the implementation of 
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the traditional culture of Muslims and Christians living in the Ambonese islands (Hasyim 
Marasabessy, an interview in Ambon, 10 August 2002). 
In addition, Lakollo (1999), an Ambonese representative of the PRS, argued that 
reconciliation would involve not only the re-implementation of Pela Gandong, but also a 
re-evaluation of the economic relationship between the indigenous Ambonese and the 
transmigrant and migrant communities, which had competed before the conflict. Lakollo 
suggested to the local government that: 'local government policy in facilitating economic 
and trade instruments ... and business opportunities must ensure equality and justice 
without discriminating against any group, from the perspectives of ethnicity, religion and 
race' (1999: 92). 
Leirissa (2000) agreed with Lakollo (1999) that adat as an instrument of reconciliation 
was less effective than the segregation of Ambonese society, as intended by provocateurs, 
as a means of instituting peace. Leirissa suggested that: 
A thorough solution depends on changing the pattern of state and society relations 
between national and local elites. A solution can be achieved if the New Order 
system of development is discarded. Development projects and the distribution of 
investment contracts between the local and national governments must not be 
marred by corruption, collusion and nepotism (2000: 58). 
Another problem in achieving reconciliation was the allegation by local Muslims that 
Christians had been involved in the RMS separatist movement. The Kelompok Pembela 
Islam Maluku (Kopim, the Moluccan Islamic Defenders Group), during their meeting with 
President Wahid on September 2000, stated that Christians had given a false account of 
the conflict. For example, Christians had stated that Muslims had initiated the conflict on 
19 January 1999. Christians also insisted that the Laskar Jihad return to Java. The Muslim 
Working Group (Indo. Pokja: Kelompok Kerja) for reconciliation in the Moluccas, 
(represented by Ali Fauzy, Husein Toisuta, Rustam Kastor, M. Natsir Rahawarin, Suhaidi 
Samallo, A.A. Leurima and Hamadi Husein), claimed that 'the Laskar Jihad had helped 
the Moluccan Muslims to defend the Muslim religion and Indonesian nation against the 
threat posed by the RMS separatist group' (Kopim, 2000: 6). 
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The reasons given by those Muslim representatives for their support of the role played by 
the Laskar Jihad were contrary to the fact that the Laskar Jihad had been reluctant to stop 
the war. The differences in approach towards reconciliation between the Moluccan 
Muslims and Christians meant that achieving peace would be a long process. The Muslim 
group argued: 
That Christians had not been ready to reconcile, whilst Muslims had kept up their 
attempts in a spirit of a good-will to finish the war. Therefore, we offer a basis to 
end the religious war ... founded on acknowledgment by Christians of their 
involvement in the slaughter of Muslims on 19 January 1999 as mobilised by the 
RMS. They asked that the Christian leaders involved in the conflict be prosecuted, 
including leaders of mass organisations through a political mechanism [involving 
central government when local political leaders are implicated] (Kopim, 2000: 7-
8). 
Of course, this was a one-sided argument by radical Muslims without taking into account 
the views of Christians and other analyses which suggest that the Laskar Jihad had 
provoked local Muslims by continuing their claims of a RMS separatist threat. In fact, the 
myth of a separatist threat was a strategum of military elites in the Moluccas, of 
paramilitary forces and of radical Muslims, who indoctrinated local Muslims. The 
influence of the FKM [representing RMS aspirations] was limited. They only had a small 
number of Christian followers in the Ambonese islands (Tony Pariela, an interview in 
Ambon, 31 July 2002). 
Most Ambonese Muslims and Christians supported the reconciliation and peace-building 
attempts. As the Pusat Rujuk Sosial ( 1999) stated, approximately twenty per cent of 
Muslims and Christians were perusuh (instigators of violence) and eighty per cent were 
baik-baik (good people), who supported peace and reconciliation. This rough percentage 
was a simplification of the social boundaries in the Ambonese islands, which had a higher 
degree of segregation after three years of conflict. The number of peace-building 
supporters depended upon the stages in the development of the conflict. When under 
desperate circumstances, Muslims and Christians would get involved in the conflict. 
During more peaceful times they would strongly support reconciliation, for example, as 
they did after the Malino II agreement and the return of the Laskar Jihad to Java when 
circumstances become more peaceful. In the light of the on-going competition in the lead-
up to the 2003 elections for governor, the more neutral observations of outsiders should be 
helpful. 
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5.4 The Debates Among Non-Ambonese over Reconciliation 
Other views were held by non-Ambonese Muslims and Christians, religious leaders, 
government officers and western observers, who analysed the process of reconciliation 
after the Ambon conflict. It is important to compare the indigenous Ambonese and 
outsider views. The debate outside the Moluccas focused on several issues: dialogue 
between conflicting factions as a method of reconciliation; the application of the Pela 
Gandong tradition as the reconciliation instrument; the role of the government and 
security forces in the reconciliation process and, the future of democracy in the Ambonese 
islands and the Moluccas. 
In the context of the national debate over the Pela Gandong tradition, Azra (MUI, 2000), 
the rector of the State Institute for Islamic Studies of Jakarta, argued that it was important 
to restructure the inter-ethnic and inter-religious patterns of relationship as a means 
towards reconciliation. There was a need for openness, truth and sincere dialogue among 
conflicting factions, to provide a basis for sharing in the formulation of regional 
institutions (Perda, Ind. Peraturan Daerah) (MUI, 2000: xvii). Azra's argument is in line 
with Suparlan's view of that an ethno-religious approach has to be taken to achieve 
reconciliation. 
Suparlan (2001 ), stated that what was needed was an application of the Ambonese 
tradition of Pela Gandong for Muslims and Christians, not only symbolically (as 
attempted by the regional government) but in actuality to forge sacred ties between the 
conflicting communities. The application of the tradition needed two elements: a neutral 
mediator and compensation for the houses and properties of both communities that had 
been destroyed (Suparlan, 2001: 28-29). However, Suparlan' s idea of the application of 
Pela Gandong needed more elaboration, as the tradition only represented an alliance 
between two or a limited number of communities or regions. The original tradition of Pela 
Gandong needed a broader application not only to include indigenous communities of 
certain clans, but also the various ethnic and other religious communities living in the 
Ambonese islands. 
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The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulama Council) suggested that the 
Muslim and Christian communities adapt their local values and cultures to the modem 
demands of economic and political development (MUI, 2000). Undoubtedly, ethnic and 
religious adaptation in the modem era needs the guidance of local ethnic and religious 
elites, who will have pivotal roles in accommodating the values of a modem culture into a 
local ethnic and religious framework. As MUI suggested: 
Christian missionaries should guide Moluccan Christians in taking up the spirit of 
the Protestant ethic, which has been successful in bringing Western society to the 
point at which its civilisation is today . . . Muslim Ulama (scholars) should also 
bring Moluccan Muslims into a harmonious and dynamic pattern of life similar to 
the period of the Prophet Muhammad, which is today called masyarakat madani 
(civil society). By this approach, the primitive competition that exists in the 
Moluccas will change into a dynamic and positive competition between Muslims 
and Christians (2000: 118). 
Additionally, MUI (2000) also asserted the importance of regional restructuring to 
accommodate the demands of Ambonese Muslims and Christians now living in separate 
areas delineated by clear religious boundaries, but with equal and free access to public 
facilities . Both communities should have direct and free communication with the presence 
of a professional security force to maintain public order. Obviously, these views were in 
contrast with those of indigenous Ambonese communities, which were still eager to live 
without rigid and clear ethnic and religious borders. Siahainenia (2000) asserted that local 
Ambonese should have a role in the reconciliation process, as suggested by President 
Wahid and Vice-President Megawati during their visit to Ambon in December 1999. 
However, Siahainenia found that the existing reconciliation process was in appearance 
only for the reason that to recover from the conflict required more than just the rebuilding 
of religious buildings, such as churches and mosques. Because 'the conflict had caused the 
complete loss at a mental or cognitive level of a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood', 
these bonds would need to be re-established (Siahainenia, 2000: 130-131 ). The long 
period of conflict had destroyed the sense of being one family in the Moluccas and it 
drove people into the situation where they began competing with each other. Furthermore, 
Suharto (MUI, 2000), a representative of the National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM), stated that the process of reconciliation needed suburban communication 
posts to be set up to facilitate the meeting of Muslims and Christians. Local and central 
government, the Komnas HAM and regional informal leaders (tetua adat) could be 
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effective mediators between both communities in the longer term. Soeharto's final and 
important recommendation was for the transparent prosecution of the local and national 
provocateurs under national law (MUI, 2000). 
While Budyatna (MUI, 2000) agreed that a win-win solution was possible through 
dialogue and that existing subcultures must be made the foundation of a national culture, 
he also emphasised external factors. He suggested that various ethnic, religious and racial 
groups should not be politicised by the central government as a means to control local 
regions. He asserted that Moluccans, themselves, must realise that the conflict was 
primarily the result of external instigation, rather than a consequence of local ethnic and 
religious divisions (MUI, 2000). 
By contrast, Azra emphasised a security approach. He took the position that the security 
forces should take a strong approach to dealing with violence, especially when handling 
radical groups in the Muslim and Christian communities (MUI, 2000). This idea was 
popular amongst security forces members and Jakarta elites. For example, Gani (2002), a 
Police chief in the Moluccas, found the security approach to be an effective way of 
preventing further illegal trade in weapons, and further movement of paramilitaries 
between other islands and Ambon. Gani also argued that civil government should 
strengthen enforcement law (2002). However, the security approach as part of a 
reconciliation process ran into difficulties, as many former members of the security forces 
deserted and joined Muslim and Christian paramilitary organisations resulting in further 
casualties. Moreover, during certain periods of the conflict army members supported one 
group and against the other. For example, in December 1999, the security apparatus 
allowed Muslims to burn the Silo church and even helped them to attack Christians 
(Abdulghani Fabanyo, an interview in Ambon, 18 August 2002). In addition, the Jakarta-
based TAP AK Ambon NGO stated that the TNI and police officers had failed to secure the 
situation and they were reluctant to prosecute TNI and police deserters, who were 
identified as being involved in the conflict (Salampessy and Husein, 2001). 
Furthermore, Van Klinken (2001) suggested that both local and national elites took 
advantage of the segregation of Ambonese Muslims and Christians to advance their own 
interests as a result of the conflict. He advocated two methods ofreconciliation (a) to 
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'democratise the state, especially at the local level, thereby depriving war-mongering 
elites of their legitimacy', and (b) to 'make the state effective for all its citizens especially 
by providing a sense of security' (Van Klinken, 2001: 25). Van Klinken, however, did not 
consider that the process of local autonomy was still immature even though the central 
government still attempted to retain its control in local politics. Budyatna (MUI, 2000) 
suggested that total regional autonomy needed to be put in place to strengthen local 
government so that it could solve local problems under local authority using appropriate 
local political and cultural means. 
Democratisation in the local region means the freedom for local authorities to act without 
central government intervention. Further, Van Klinken (2001) has emphasised the 
importance of the security forces in maintaining security so that local democracy can 
function. However, democracy at the local level is really something of a myth. Local 
Muslims supported Jakarta Ambonese, Freddy Latumahina, a Christian and Golkar 
parliament member, as a potential candidate for governor. They accused the local 
Christian Ambonese candidate, Zeth Sahuburua, of being involved in the conflict and 
supporting the RMS (Kastor, 2002). These myths concerning Zeth Sahuburua and the 
RMS movement were popular amongst local Muslims and were utilised by Jakarta 
politicians to retain their control of the Moluccas. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The reconciliation process in the Ambonese islands has had two components. A top- down 
approach as led by the central and local governments with the limited participation of 
local communities was the most common approach to reconciliation in the islands. By 
contrast, the bottom-up approach to reconciliation was based on broader community 
participation with the input of ordinary people, including those who had been directly 
involved in the conflict as the kapitans (commanders) and members of paramilitaries. 
However, both approaches to reconciliation had difficulties in reaching out to the radical 
groups and premans, who were active in the battlefield. 
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The viewpoints of local Ambonese Muslims and Christians, central government officers, 
non-Ambonese religious leaders and Indonesian and Western intellectuals with respect to 
reconciliation and the future of Ambon can be summed up in several points. First, the 
basic instrument to bring about a thorough reconciliation was to be the re-implementation 
of the local culture of Pela Gandong. It was to include transmigrant and migrant Muslims 
living in the Ambonese islands. The re-implementation of the tradition was to be 
supported by government laws to make agreements legally binding without loosing the 
sacredness and symbolism of the pact. Secondly, power-sharing is essential for both 
communities in terms of their access to the economy, politics and public facilities within 
the context of a broader application of regional autonomy. Finally, the democratisation of 
regional government without the intervention of central government is needed to return to 
traditional models of leadership. 
A further puzzle, then, is how to relate the pre-colonial history of Ambonese Muslims and 
Christians to contemporary circumstances. In Ambon today there continues to be 
competition, segregation as well as an element of harmony between both communities. 
Ambonese have passed through a particularly violent chapter in their history as they have 
entered the post-New Order period. What their future will be depends on whether or not 
they will be able to solve their problems at the local level. 
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Chapter Six 
A Reflection on Conflict and Reconciliation in Ambon 
This thesis has traced the origin of Muslim and Christian conflict in Ambon between 1999 
and 2002. Ethno-religious segregation and the involvement of premans, thugs, gangsters 
and Laskars in the Ambon conflict have been identified as key factors, which forced the 
multi-ethnic and religious communities in the Ambonese islands onto an unexpected 
collision course. In more recent times in the post-conflict era, Ambonese Muslims and 
Christians have had to shift from a perception of themselves as a harmonious community 
to a position of greater transparency in economic and political relations. Certainly, as Van 
Klinken (2001) has suggested, the future of the reconciliation and local democratisation 
process will depend on whether a new basis for ethno-religious harmony can be 
established - one with a clear division but equal sharing between both communities within 
the framework of regional autonomy. 
As a result of the experience of segregation during the colonial period, Muslims have a 
memory of discrimination against their community. In contrast, during Soeharto's New 
Order period, religious segregation became ethno-religious segregation as a result of the 
transmigration policy, which altered the population composition from one of Christian 
dominance in the colonial period to one of Muslim dominance in the last decade of the 
New Order. The centralisation of demographic policy as represented by the transmigration 
program influenced local economic and political competition disadvantaging indigenous 
Ambonese, compared to the migrant community. Furthermore, the central government 
intentionally kept control of local politics by spreading rumours of Christian domination 
of the economy, politics and education, thereby causing anxiety among many Muslim 
groups. 
The inherent problems in Muslim-Christian relations were exacerbated because of the 
long-term centralisation of New Order development policy, which created a stereotyping 
of multi-religious and multi-ethnic groups in local and national politics. Pariela's (1996) 
comparison of skilled Muslim traders and poor Soya Atas Christian peasants during the 
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last decade of the New Order confirmed the general ethno-religious segregation, that 
existed between Ambonese Muslims and Christians in terms of the economy, politics and 
culture. Further, the Soya Atas study depicted the culture of the Ambonese community in 
Ambon city as ranging from traditional to modem. This was similar to the culture of 
metropolitan communities in the big cities of Java, where both State and private 
premanism had first taken root (Lindsey, 2001). These two phenomena (ethno-religious 
segregation and a culture of premanism) contributed to the outbreak and the longevity of 
the Ambon conflict, which was more prolonged than either the Ambonese or Indonesians 
had anticipated. 
The preman or thugs, gangsters and laskar, during different stages of the conflict were 
connected with different elements and groups. In the early period, the Coker thugs, both 
the Berty Loupaty and Agus Watimena (d. 2001) groups, played major roles with the 
backing elements of the Special Armed Forces (Kopassus). The Ambonese thugs of 
Jakarta and Ambon incited and inflamed feelings against the Butonese, Buginese, 
Makassarese, Javanese and Sumatran migrants (generally called the BBM). They were the 
main players in the first few months of the conflict working to incite and solidify the 
separate Muslim and Christian communities. These methods were exploited by both 
Ambonese Muslims and Christians and thereby shifted the conflict from an ethnic to a 
religious conflict. Furthermore, it appears that deserters from the Indonesian Armed 
Forces and the police force widened the divisions, by getting involved in the conflict 
between each of the communities. In late 1999, it was a generally held belief amongst the 
general populace that the Mobile Brigade (Brimob) supported the local Christians and that 
the Armed Forces gave support to local Muslims. The deserters as well as elements of the 
security forces may have been involved also after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad by 
helping to smuggle illegally acquired standard military weapons into both the Muslim and 
Christian regions. 
Furthermore, in 2000 the Ambonese and Javanese Muslim media presented the conflict as 
one against Christian separatists with Muslims fighting a Jihad in Ambon, under the 
leadership of the Laskar Jihad. The aim of the Jihad was not only to shield Muslims 
against the Christian menace, but also to preserve the unity of the Republic of Indonesia 
from the hazards of separatism. 
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The Jihad movements even found support from Yemeni and Saudi Arabian Salafy clerics, 
who gave religious backing for Jihad forces to travel from Java to Ambon, and then on to 
Poso, Papua, East Kalimantan and Aceh. This was abruptly blocked after international 
reaction to terrorism following the 11th September 2001 bombing. Nonetheless, the influx 
of Jihad groups into the Moluccas impacted on local Muslims and Christians. The help 
given by Jihad groups to Ambonese Muslims in attacking Christians changed the 
complexion of the conflict from Christian control in 1999 to Muslim control in 2000. 
Likewise, their radical religious norms were taken up by some local Muslim groups, in 
particular the Moluccan Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) led by Husni Putuhena and the 
Task Force of the Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar led by Muhammad At-Tamimy. 
Obviously, their impact on Ambonese Muslims weakened after their return to Java in late 
2002. Certainly, at first local Muslims felt secure with the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, but 
later local Muslims found that they had some ideological and political differences with 
them. Indigenous Muslims with their Sunni practices and tolerance of non-Muslim 
practices as a result of a long association with animists, Catholics and Protestants were 
confronted by a rigid Salafy Islamic ideology, which urged religious purification based on 
the Qur' an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
On the other hand, Ambonese Christians reacted strongly to the arrival of the Laskar Jihad 
resulting in a rise of Christian solidarity. Initially, Christian battlefield leaders founded the 
Laskar Kristus (Christ Warriors) under commander-in-chief, Agus Watimena. Christians 
experienced the terrors of the Jihad paramilitaries with their sudden attacks, suicide 
bombings and mass killings. This Jihad terror prompted Christians to reach out to request 
international action be taken against human rights violators in the Moluccas. 
Reconciliation attempts made by Muslims and Christians at their own initiative and led by 
local and central government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) yielded few 
results from 1999 to 2002, but began to produce fruit after the conflict waned and 
especially after the return of the Jihad warriors to Java. However, the reconciliation 
process is being challenged by further competition between the two communities in the 
lead-up to elections for governor in May 2003 and by a jossling for political position and 
access to public resources. 
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Endeavours toward reconciliation were successful in the Wayame region, where its 'Team 
of Twenty' arising out of the initiative of both the Muslim and Christian communities was 
able to prove that the bottom-up approach to reconciliation is the most successful strategy. 
By contrast, the central government, local government and security forces' initiatives 
toward reconciliation have failed to end the conflict, as they were driven by their 
respective political interests at both the local and national levels. The top-down 
reconciliation approach resulted in a decline in the credibility of the government in the 
eyes of ordinary people. It also underlined the importance of having policies that included 
the general community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The central 
government, especially during the Wahid Presidency, when large numbers ofTNI and 
Police officer deserters opposed the regime, failed to bring about a reconciliation in 
Ambon. Similarly, the local government, even with the extra-powers it had during the 
civil emergency, failed to come up with a workable reconciliation process because of 
vested political interests. Furthermore, the security apparatus became a player in local 
politics. 
NGOs succeeded in accommodating the demands of the grassroots and government in the 
process of reconciliation and recovery. The emergence of the NGOs in the Ambonese 
islands during the conflict had the consequence of bringing about a rise in civil society 
involvement in Ambon. However, they were hampered by negative perceptions as a result 
of the activities of a number of 'red'-NGOs, which were organised by local government 
officers taking advantage of central government and international funds, for their short-
term programs. They were based on temporary circumstances without seriously projecting 
for the longer term. Therefore, it is important for the government and local community to 
restructure existing NGOs and to commit to a recovery from the conflict taking a gradual, 
evolutionary approach. 
The current challenge in local politics as the policy of local autonomy is being 
implemented is to encourage the participation of the indigenous communities. A 
consequence of these developments will be that local groups in competition with migrants 
will need to have some mechanism for allowing sharing of political power and economic 
opportunities. As Van Klinken (2001) and Budyatna (MUI, 2000) have suggested, a win-
win situation is possible among competing factions and is the rational choice for the future 
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for Ambonese Muslims and Christians. However, this depends on whether such a 
mechanism can be agreed upon. 
Local political reform is useless unless the central government relinquishes its grip on 
local government, which is based on the belief that it needs to maintain control to ensure 
that separatist groups in support of Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku 
Sela tan) do not arise. The Front Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM, the Moluccas Sovereign 
Front) supporting Moluccan separatism was deliberately demonised by former and active 
security force members in Ambon and Jakarta to legitimate the deployment of the security 
apparatus (TNI and police force) in Ambon. President Wahid and later President 
Megawati failed to deal with security force involvement in the dynamics of the Ambonese 
conflict and in post-conflict politics. 
A major issue will be the political and economic competition between Muslims and 
Christians, and between local and central governments. Elections for governor in 2003 
will indicate the level of competition from these various quarters. Local Muslims 
exploited the Christian-cum-separatist myth to gain political concessions from central 
government in the form of power-sharing arrangements and access to economic and 
political resources. 
Ambonese Christians resent Muslims' claims of a Christian-cum-separatist movement and 
seek the immediate application of regional autonomy, which will allow local control of 
politics. However, the increased security force involvement in national politics during the 
Megawati period has been motivated by the desire to restore central authority in order to 
protect the unity of Indonesia and to control any regional conflict. This is a failure of the 
post-New Order regime, which is continuing the previous policies of the New Order. In 
reality, the era of regional autonomy requires a prudent and profound manifestation of 
central government so as to enable the distribution of local resources under just and fair 
local governance. Local authorities in Ambon with its variety of religions, ethnicities and 
political interests must operate on the basis of a transparent, fair and just agreement taking 
into account sacred and traditional Pela Gandong values emphasising harmonious 
relationship. There must also be a strong desire to implement future policy under the local 
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authority of a regional government, which is allowed to operate in a secure environment 
guaranteed by a professional security force not involved in politics. 
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